The battles of the British Army : $b being a popular account of all the principal engagements during the last hundred yearsBlackwood, Robert Melvin
History
The battles of the British Army : $b being a popular account of all the principal engagements during the last hundred years
Blackwood, Robert Melvin
Battles -- Great Britain; Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
On reaching Abrantes on the 7th July, it was correctly ascertained
that, instead of retiring on Madrid, Victor was concentrating at
Merida, intending, probably, to cross the Guadiana, and attack Cuesta
before the British could come to his assistance. Propositions therefore
for a combined movement were made by Sir Arthur Wellesley to the
“Spanish general,” and willingly acceded to, and the British moved
forward to the Teitar, to unite, as it was believed, in an operation
upon Madrid.
A most able plan for marching at once for the recovery of the capital
was arranged at a conference between the allied commanders. The British
and Spanish armies, taking the right bank of the Tagus, were to advance
directly forward. Venegas, with fourteen thousand Spaniards, was
to threaten Aranjuez, and, if possible, take possession of Toledo;
while two other Spanish divisions should hold the passes of Banos and
Perales; and five thousand Portuguese, under Sir Robert Wilson, were to
act independently, and annoy the French flanks and rear as they best
could.
The British consequently moved by Salvatiera and Placentia, effecting a
junction with Cuesta at Oropesa on the 20th of July. On the 22nd Victor
had retired and taken a position on the Alberche. The opportunity was
at once given for attacking him, but Cuesta obstinately declined; and
Victor, hearing that Wilson was already in his rear at Escalona, made
a night march on Torrijos.
Cuesta was a singular medley of opposite qualities. He was exceedingly
brave, had some daring, overweening pride, and a most asinine
obstinacy. Finding it desirable for the prosperity of the common
cause to submit to the old man’s folly, Sir Arthur Wellesley acted
with singular forbearance. It had been arranged that Victor should
be attacked on the 23rd, and when the British general reached his
confederate’s quarters to arrange the necessary details on the evening
of the 22nd, Cuesta was asleep, and no one dared to waken him. At
dawn, the British divisions were under arms, but Cuesta could not be
disturbed till seven! At last an interview did take place, and then
the weak old man positively declined to fight, because the day was
_Sunday_. Victor had but twenty thousand men with him at the moment.
The Alberche was fordable--the right and centre assailable; Cuesta’s
army numbered forty-seven thousand, and Wellesley’s about twenty-one.
Was ever such an opportunity lost? and all, too, through the stupid
bigotry of a sleepy-headed Spaniard.
While Sir Arthur halted at Talavera, having two divisions across the
river at Casa Leguas, Cuesta followed the French, who as he persuaded
himself were retreating, but Sebastiani had marched from Toledo and
joined Victor, while Joseph Buonaparte, having united his corps to
Jourdan’s, was hastening to a common centre. The whole united at
Torrijos, forming a corps _d’armée_ of nearly fifty thousand men.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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