The human state may be conceived as a high and compound organism that, by the union of many individuals, and by their division into classes with different functions, has developed into a form always becoming more complicated. To carry out our comparison better, let us assume that all the individuals united in the human state arose from a single pair. The single pair would be the rudiment of the whole state, and would bear the same significance in the development of the state, as the fertilised egg bears to the development of the adult. The characters of the state, its different organisations for protection, for tilling the soil, for trade, for government, and for education, must be explained causally from the characters of the first pair, which we take as the human rudiment, and from the outer conditions under which that pair and the generations that arose from it had to live. As the state develops, urban and district communities, unions for husbandry and manufactures, colleges of physicians, parliaments, ministries, armies, and so forth, appear. All this visible complexity depends upon individuals associated for definite purposes and specialised in different directions. It would certainly not occur to anyone to explain the growth of this complexity in the developing state by the assumption that this secondary complexity was preformed as definite material particles present in the first pair, although the first pair is the rudiment of the whole. Much comment is unnecessary; everyone must feel that this attempt to explain the causal relations is on the wrong track, that it is perverse to try to explain the complex characters of the human state by a system of architecturally arranged particles stored within the first pair. The organisations arising from the co-operation of many men are something new, and cannot be regarded as present in the organizations of one man. No doubt they depend, in the last resort, upon human nature, but by no means in this crude, mechanical fashion. But what applies to the causal relations between the state-organism and men applies also, _ceteris paribus_, to the explanation of the causal relations between the rudiments in the egg and the organism to which the egg gives rise. For these an explanation cannot be expected on the lines of Weismann's doctrine of determinants, as that implies a fundamentally erroneous assumption. It refers organizations that depend upon cell-communities to organizations of material particles within a cell. 'To understand inheritance,' says Naegeli, with truth, 'we require not an independent, special symbol for every difference resulting from time, space, and quality, but a substance that, by the linking of the limited number of elements in it, can exhibit every possible combination of differences, and that by permutation can pass into another combination of differences.'