The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present dayJane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
History
The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present day
Jane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
Great Britain -- History, Naval; Great Britain. Royal Navy -- History; Warships -- Great Britain -- History
Early on the 23rd, fire was opened on both sides, and the inhabitants
of the town fled to a chapel on the hill. The bombardment continued
till noon, when the “cease fire” was ordered, so that results might be
ascertained. It was found that some of the batteries were disabled, and
it was then decided to land in the boats and capture them.
On the cessation of fire, the inhabitants, mostly women and priests,
who had fled out of the town, began to come back. Sir Cloudesley
Shovell (who was on board Byng’s flagship) ordered a gun to be fired
across these; whereupon they all ran back to the chapel in which they
had been sheltered. This gun was taken by the fleet generally to be
a signal to re-open the bombardment. Under cover of this firing, the
landing party got ashore, and had things much their own way till about
a hundred of them were killed or wounded by the blowing up of the
Castle.
At this they began to retreat, but reinforcements arriving, they
retrieved the position and captured other works without difficulty,
establishing themselves between the town and the chapel where the women
had taken refuge. Giving this as his reason, the Governor capitulated
next day. His entire garrison, according to Torrington’s Memoirs,
consisted of but eighty men. The Anglo-Dutch force lost three officers
and fifty-seven men killed, eight officers and 207 men wounded.
Thus the capture of Gibraltar, “the impregnable.” At Toulon, a large
French fleet was getting ready for sea--a fleet quite large enough
to have done to the English what Teggethoff, in 1866, did to the
bombarding Italians at Lissa.
There seems little doubt that Rooke under-estimated his fleet. On the
other hand, as he had look-outs, and the wind was not in the enemy’s
favour, the risks he actually ran were trifling compared to those taken
by Persano. From which many lessons have been deduced and morals drawn.
In actual fact, however, it is greatly to be doubted whether either
commander thought round the matter at all. The “science” of naval
warfare is a thing of quite modern origin, and the strategies displayed
by most admirals in the past--if studied with an unbiassed mind--are
just as likely to be luck as forethought. Analogous to this is Ruskin
on the artist Turner. Turner painted wonderful pictures: Ruskin found
wonderful meanings in them. These “meanings” were, however, more news
to Turner than to anyone else!
On August 10th, the French fleet, reported as sixty-six sail, was
sighted thirty miles off by a look-out ship. Rooke’s fleet at that time
was short of five Dutch ships which he had sent away, twelve other
ships were watering at Tetuan--miles away from him--and all the marines
of the fleet were on shore at Gibraltar as garrison. The light craft
were sent into Gibraltar to bring back half the marines as quickly
as possible, while the main fleet retreated to pick up the Tetuan
division, and later got its marines on board.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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