The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present dayJane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
History
The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present day
Jane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
Great Britain -- History, Naval; Great Britain. Royal Navy -- History; Warships -- Great Britain -- History
In 1718, Spain, which had recently made some considerable efforts
towards the creation of naval power, used her power for an attack on
Sicily. Admiral Byng arriving with a superior English fleet, attacked
and destroyed the greater part of the Spanish squadron in the Battle
of Cape Passaro. No state of war existed. The Spaniards had attacked
an English ally, and this was Byng’s only excuse for action. A few
months later war was formally declared against Spain, and early in 1719
a curious replica of the Armada took place. Forty Spanish transports,
escorted by merely five warships, sailed from Cadiz for the coast of
Scotland; the idea being that the 5,000 troops which they carried
should co-operate in a Jacobite rising. This “Armada” was dispersed
by a severe gale off Cape Finisterre, and only a small fraction of it
reached the coast of Ross, where a landing, easily defeated by the
military, was made. It is noteworthy that no fleet met the expedition,
and it was not till a month after its dispersal in a gale that Norris
sailed to look for it.
The remainder of this particular war, which lasted only three years,
was devoted to the re-conquest of Sicily and the capture of Vigo. Peace
was concluded in 1721. In the course of this war the usual combined
attack was made upon Gibraltar in 1720; but the arrival of an English
fleet easily relieved the garrison.
At and about this time the Russian fleet, hitherto allies, became the
enemy, and early in 1720 Admiral Norris was despatched to assist the
Swedes against them. He appears to have done very little save squabble
with the Swedish admiral as to precedence. In any case the Russians
did much as they listed against the Swedish coast till Sweden had to
sue for peace, and Russia became the predominant Baltic naval power.
Her position as such was the more extraordinary in that the Russian
fleet was technically very incompetent. The situation was mainly
brought about by the personal genius of Peter the Great. His ships were
generally the speedier, and he issued the strictest orders that no
enemy was to be engaged unless at least one-third inferior in power. In
the presence of an enemy the Swedes considered nothing,[26] the English
comparatively little. The brain of Peter, was, therefore, an easy match
for them, despite the technical inferiority of his _personnel_. This
campaign is a most striking illustration of Alexander the Great’s
maxim “that an army of sheep led by a lion is better than an army of
lions led by a sheep.”
In 1726, an Anglo-Danish naval demonstration against Russia took place
at Kronstadt, but nothing came of the incident, which was repeated
equally ineffectually in the following year, when larger preparations
were made.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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