According to some writers, Von Benedek committed an error in holding his advanced posts in the villages on the Bistritz with small forces (which in some cases did not exceed a battalion), while the Prussian advanced-guards generally consisted of a brigade at least. Derrécagaix says: “It was of importance to the Imperial Army to compel the Prussian forces to deploy at the earliest moment; to tire them before their arrival at the Bistritz; to dispute the passage of that river, which constituted an obstacle, in order that they might approach the main position only after having exhausted their efforts and lost their _élan_ through heavy casualties.” To this end, he suggests that the Austrians should have established west of the Bistritz, on the two roads by which the Prussians must necessarily have advanced, two strong advanced posts, composed of troops of all three arms, and sufficiently strong to resist the enemy’s advanced-guards. He continues: “The Bistritz formed a first line of defense, on which it would have been possible to check the assailant’s efforts. It possessed the peculiarity of having all along its course villages distant from 1,000 to 1,500 meters, and separated by marshy meadows with difficult approaches. With some batteries in rear of the intervals which separated the villages, it would have been possible to hold them a certain time, and compel the enemy to execute a complete deployment. The Imperial Army had, it is true, on the Bistritz and beyond, detachments of considerable strength. But they played an insignificant part, by reason of the orders given, or modified their positions in the morning. As a result, the line of the Bistritz, its banks, the villages and the woods beyond, were occupied by the Prussians without great efforts, and they had from that moment defensive _points d’appui_ on which it was possible to await events and sustain the fight.” It is impossible to agree fully with Derrécagaix on this point. Speaking of defensible points in front of a position, Hamley says: “A feature of this kind will be especially valuable in front of what would otherwise be a weak part of the position. Strong in itself, and its garrison constantly reinforced from the line; while the ground in front is swept by batteries, such a point is difficult to attack directly; the enemy cannot attempt to surround it without exposing the flank and rear of the attacking troops; and to pass by it in order to reach the position, the assailants must expose their flank to its fire. If several such points exist, they support each other, isolate the parts of the enemy’s attack, and force him to expend his strength in costly attacks on them: in fact, they play the part of bastions in a line of fortification. But it is important that they should be within supporting distance and easy of covered access from the rear; failing these conditions, they had better be destroyed, if possible, as defenses, and abandoned to the enemy.”