The only village on the Bistritz that had any real value was Nechanitz. Von Benedek’s weak points were his flanks. Had Nechanitz been occupied in strong force, the turning of the Austrian left by the Army of the Elbe would have been a matter of extreme difficulty, if not a downright impossibility. We have seen that the retreat of the Austrian brigade from Sadowa uncovered the flanks of the advanced posts, and compelled the withdrawal of the troops successively from Dohalitz, Dohalica and Mokrowous; and it might seem, at first, that the abandonment of Nechanitz might have been caused in a similar manner: but such is not the case. The heights in rear of that village, and between it and Hradek, should have been held by two corps, from which a strong detachment should have been placed in Nechanitz. This detachment could easily have been reinforced as occasion demanded. Any attempt to make a flank attack upon the village, from the direction of Popowitz, would have been made over unfavorable ground, and the attacking force could have been assailed in flank by Austrian troops from the heights. Attempts to cross at Kuncitz or Boharna could have been promptly met and repulsed; and attempts to cross further down would have extended the Prussian front to such a degree as to expose it to a dangerous counter-attack through Nechanitz. This occupation of Nechanitz would, it is true, have thrust Von Benedek’s left flank forward, towards the enemy; but that flank would have been strong in numbers and position; it would have been covered by the Bistritz (where that stream is swollen into a true obstacle); and it would have occupied a position commanding Nechanitz and Kuncitz, and within easy reinforcing distance of each. Nechanitz would have been to Von Benedek’s left what Hougomont was to Wellington’s right; and in the event of Austrian success, it would have given the same enveloping front that the British had at Waterloo. The neglect of Von Benedek to hold Nechanitz in force is surprising; for the position of his reserves indicates that he expected an attack upon his left--a not unsound calculation, as his main line of retreat lay in rear of his left wing.