In the English army there was nothing of this sort. Obedience, not coöperation, was what Wellington required, and it was all he needed. Operating as he did on a much smaller scale than Napoleon, his simpler methods were quite adequate to his wants. It is needless to say that such a relation as that which existed between Napoleon and his old companions in arms, who had begun their careers with him in Italy or Egypt, never existed to the least extent in the English service. The Prussian army was managed differently from either the English or French. Baron Müffling, who was the Prussian _attaché_ at the headquarters of the Duke of Wellington, says:—[55] “I perceived that the Duke exercised far greater power in the army he commanded than Prince Blücher in the one committed to his care. The rules of the English service permitted the Duke’s suspending any officer and sending him back to England. * * * Amongst all the generals, from the leaders of corps to the commanders of brigades, not one was to be found in the active army who had been known as refractory. “It was not the custom in this army to criticise or control the commander-in-chief. Discipline was strictly enforced; every one knew his rights and his duties. The Duke, in matters of service, was very short and decided.” It is clear that Baron Müffling had seen a very different state of things prevailing in the Prussian service,[56] where it would seem that advice was sometimes thrust upon the general-in-chief, and even criticism was not silent. Perhaps the fact that the Prussian army was always organized in corps, and that the chiefs of corps and all the other high officers were men of an equal social rank, rendered it hard to conduct matters according to the far more soldierly ways prevailing in the English service. Whatever may have been the reason, however, such would seem to have been the fact in the early part of this century. FOOTNOTES: [47] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 81, 82. See vol. 2, p. 202, note G, where it is shown that the number of men in the artillery given by Wagner is much too small. [48] The view of the Prussian army presented here is that of Charras (vol. 1, p. 89); but Delbrück, the biographer of Gneisenau, states that many of the troops were inexperienced, and some were half-hearted in the cause. Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 381, 382. _Cf._ Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 302, 303. [49] For instance, at the battle of Waterloo, troops of the 1st Corps, that of the Prince of Orange, were stationed on both ends of the line. [50] These figures are taken from Siborne. [51] This brigade was composed of one regiment of Nassau, in three battalions, and one regiment of Orange-Nassau and numbered 4,300 men. [52] Including 4,300 Nassauers. [53] Müffling, Passages; pp. 204, 223. [54] Gurwood, vol. xii, pp. 358, 509,—letters to Lt. Gen. Stewart, May 8, and to Earl Bathurst, June 25, 1815. [55] Müffling, Passages; pp. 213, 214.