The Control _Yüan_ is of interest to Westerners, because of the novelty of its functions. Through the courtesy of the _Yüan_ President, a full official memorandum on the structure and procedure was prepared, surveying the work of the _Yüan_ during the course of the war. This is reproduced as Appendices I (E) and I (F) below.[28] Some of the unofficial observers, both Western and Chinese, felt that the _Yüan_ possessed further enormous possibilities of activity, and that the need for controlment was very great indeed. In general, the _Yüan_ resembles its legislative, judicial and examination coordinates, in that the war-time executive growth has relegated it to a secondary position. [Footnote 28: See p. 313 and p. 318.] Decrease in the importance of the _yüan_ system during hostilities cannot be taken, by a too simple cause-and-effect argument, as proof of the unwieldy or impractical character of this five-power system. Measured on a scale of other world governments, success is slow; but it is enormous in contrast to other Chinese central political institutions. At present, it is most improbable that the form of government will be changed, save in the event of catastrophe beyond all reckoning. CHAPTER III CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS The outbreak and continuance of war has left the fulcrum of power relatively untouched. The highest organs of state are primarily in Kuomintang hands; the Party Chief of the Kuomintang is, even at law, governmentally more important today than in 1937; and the constitutional monopoly of power remains under the Kuomintang. Even changes in the highest organs--such as establishment of the Supreme National Defense Council and the Military Affairs Commission--have left very little impress on the sources of power. Reforms have altered only the mode of power, not its tenure. Modifications have, however, been introduced at the level of government just below the apex. These are important in two remarkable ways. The People's Political Council (_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_) admixed an ingredient of representation which (save for the Party) had been lacking since the dubious, betrayed, inaugural years of the Republic. Furthermore, sweeping administrative reorganization and reinvigoration made possible the vitalization of the central government in the course of the war, so that despite Japanese pressure and rising Leftist rivalry, the National Government is, on any absolute scale, becoming more powerful year by year. THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL COUNCIL