The Concept of Nature: The Tarner Lectures Delivered in Trinity College, November 1919Whitehead, Alfred North
Philosophy
The Concept of Nature: The Tarner Lectures Delivered in Trinity College, November 1919
Whitehead, Alfred North
Knowledge, Theory of; Nature; Science -- Philosophy
There is an alternative definition of the junction of two events which I
have adopted in my recent book[7]. Two events have junction when there
is a third event such that (i) it overlaps both events and (ii) it has
no part which is separated from both the given events. If either of
these alternative definitions is adopted as the definition of junction,
the other definition appears as an axiom respecting the character of
junction as we know it in nature. But we are not thinking of logical
definition so much as the formulation of the results of direct
observation. There is a certain continuity inherent in the observed
unity of an event, and these two definitions of junction are really
axioms based on observation respecting the character of this continuity.
[7] Cf. _Enquiry_.
The relations of whole and part and of overlapping are particular cases
of the junction of events. But it is possible for events to have
junction when they are separate from each other; for example, the upper
and the lower part of the Great Pyramid are divided by some imaginary
horizontal plane.
The continuity which nature derives from events has been obscured by the
illustrations which I have been obliged to give. For example I have
taken the existence of the Great Pyramid as a fairly well-known fact to
which I could safely appeal as an illustration. This is a type of event
which exhibits itself to us as the situation of a recognisable object;
and in the example chosen the object is so widely recognised that it has
received a name. An object is an entity of a different type from an
event. For example, the event which is the life of nature within the
Great Pyramid yesterday and to-day is divisible into two parts, namely
the Great Pyramid yesterday and the Great Pyramid to-day. But the
recognisable object which is also called the Great Pyramid is the same
object to-day as it was yesterday. I shall have to consider the theory
of objects in another lecture.
The whole subject is invested with an unmerited air of subtlety by the
fact that when the event is the situation of a well-marked object, we
have no language to distinguish the event from the object. In the case
of the Great Pyramid, the object is the perceived unit entity which as
perceived remains self-identical throughout the ages; while the whole
dance of molecules and the shifting play of the electromagnetic field
are ingredients of the event. An object is in a sense out of time. It is
only derivatively in time by reason of its having the relation to events
which I term 'situation.' This relation of situation will require
discussion in a subsequent lecture.
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