“I am horribly anxious, Mr. Langston,” said the veteran of Manila. “We are facing a great crisis. Our ships are going into battle, and within a few hours we shall know whether the civilian policy at Washington that has controlled our naval development--the policy that forced me to resign rather than assume the responsibility for consequences--we shall know whether that policy was wise or foolish.” “I did not suspect that you resigned for that reason,” said I. His face darkened. “Yes. There had been tension for months. The whole service was demoralised. Discipline and efficiency were destroyed. As far back as 1914, I testified before the House Committee on Naval Affairs that it would take five years to make our fleet ready to fight the fleet of any first-class naval power, and to get our personnel into proper condition. I said that we were not able to defend the Monroe Doctrine in the Atlantic, or to force the Open Door of trade in the Pacific. I might as well have spoken to the winds, and when the order came last April, against the best naval advice, to take our fleet into the Pacific, I handed in my resignation.” “You must be glad you did, in view of what happened.” “Yes; but--I am thinking of my country. I am thinking of those unfortunate ships that have come around South America without sufficient coal or provisions.” I asked Admiral Allyn how the American fleet compared with the Germans in number of ships. He shook his head. “We are far behind them. Nine years ago, in 1912, we stood next to Great Britain in naval strength; but since then we have steadily fallen back. Germany has a dozen super-dreadnoughts, ships of over 30,000 tons, while we have six. Germany has twenty dreadnoughts of from 20,000 to 30,000 tons to our ten. She has four battle-cruisers, while we have none. She has a hundred destroyers to our twenty-five.” “I understand that these figures refer to the fleets that are actually going into battle?” “Yes. Germany’s entire naval strength is a third more than that. I have accurate information. You see, our fleet is outclassed.” “But it will fight?” “Of course our fleet will fight; but--we can’t get to our base at Guantánamo--the German fleet blocks the way. For years we have begged that Guantánamo be fortified; but our request was always refused.” “Why?” “Ah, why? Why, in 1915, were we refused eighteen thousand men on the active list that were absolutely necessary to man our ships? Why have we practically no naval reserves? Why, in 1916, were the President’s reasonable demands for naval preparedness refused by Congress? I will tell you why! Because politics has been considered more than efficiency in the handling of our navy. Vital needs have been neglected, so that a show of economy could be made to the people and get their votes. Economy! Good heavens! you see where it has brought us!”