The extraordinary ardor of Major-general Lord Charles Hay, having made him much louder than others in condemning Lord Loudon's conduct, upon this occasion, a council of war was called to consider the tendency of his reflections, and the consequence was his being put under arrest. General Hopson's letter to Lord Loudon in October, three months afterward, mentions Lord Charles Hay being still under arrest, and complains of three regiments, with their commanding officers at their head, having gone "in corps" to wait upon him.] [Footnote 95: "Shortly after came letters from the Earl of Loudon, the commander-in-chief in North America, stating that he found the French 21,000 strong, and that, not having so many, he could not attack Louisburg, but should return to Halifax. Admiral Holborne, one of the sternest condemners of Byng, wrote at the same time that he, having but seventeen ships and the French nineteen, dared not attack them. There was another summer lost! Pitt expressed himself with great vehemence against the earl, and we naturally have too lofty ideas of our naval strength to suppose that seventeen of our ships are not a match for any nineteen others."--Walpole's _George II._, vol. ii., p. 231. "Admiral Holborne declined to attack the French, because, while he had seventeen ships of the line, they had eighteen, and a greater WEIGHT OF METAL, 'according to the new sea phrase,' says Chesterfield, indignantly, 'which was unknown to Blake!' (_Letter to his Son_, Sept. 30, 1757.) He adds, 'I hear that letters have been sent to both (Holborne and Loudon) with very severe reprimands.'"--Lord Mahon's _History of England_, vol. iv., p. 168. "The recent fate of Admiral Byng, who was shot on the 14th of March, 1757, for incapacity in a naval engagement, is supposed to have paralyzed the energy of many British officers at this juncture."--Graham's _United States_, vol. iv., p. 6. "Dans ce pays-ci il est bon de tuer de tems en tems un amiral pour encourager les autres."--_Candide_, ch. xxiii. "The miserable consequences of our political divisions (in 1757) produced a general unsteadiness in all our pursuits, and infused a languor and inactivity into all our military operations; for while our commanders abroad knew not who would reward their services or punish their neglects, and were not assured in what light even the best of their actions would be considered (having reason to apprehend that they might not be judged of as they were in themselves, but as their appearances might answer the end of some ruling faction), they naturally wanted that enterprising resolution, without which the best capacity, and intentions the most honest, can do nothing in war."--_Annual Register._]