The conscience of a ConservativeGoldwater, Barry M. (Barry Morris)
Philosophy
The conscience of a Conservative
Goldwater, Barry M. (Barry Morris)
Conservatism -- United States; United States -- Politics and government -- 20th century
10. We must--ourselves--be prepared to undertake military operations
against vulnerable Communist regimes. Assume we have developed nuclear
weapons that can be used in land warfare, and that we have equipped our
European divisions accordingly. Assume also a major uprising in Eastern
Europe, such as occurred in Budapest in 1956. In such a situation,
we ought to present the Kremlin with an ultimatum forbidding Soviet
intervention, and be prepared, if the ultimatum is rejected, to move a
highly mobile task force equipped with appropriate nuclear weapons to
the scene of the revolt. Our objective would be to confront the Soviet
Union with superior force in the immediate vicinity of the uprising and
to compel a Soviet withdrawal. An actual clash between American and
Soviet armies would be unlikely; the mere threat of American action,
coupled with the Kremlin’s knowledge that the fighting would occur amid
a hostile population and could easily spread to other areas, would
probably result in Soviet acceptance of the ultimatum. The Kremlin
would also be put on notice, of course, that resort to long-range
bombers and missiles would prompt automatic retaliation in kind. On
this level, we would invite the Communist leaders to choose between
total destruction of the Soviet Union, and accepting a local defeat....
Had we the will and the means for it in 1956, such a policy would have
saved the Hungarian Revolution.
This is hard counsel. But it is hard, I think, not for what it says,
but for saying it openly. Such a policy involves the risk of war? Of
course; but any policy, short of surrender, does that. Any policy that
successfully frustrates the Communists’ aim of world domination runs
the risk that the Kremlin will choose to lose in a kamikaze-finish. It
is hard counsel because it frankly acknowledges that war may be the
price of freedom, and thus intrudes on our national complacency. But is
it really so hard when it goes on to search for the most likely means
of safeguarding both our lives _and_ our freedom? Is it so hard when
we think of the risks that were taken to create our country?--risks on
which our ancestors openly and proudly staked their “lives, fortunes,
and sacred honor.” Will we do less to _save_ our country?
The risks I speak of are risks on our terms, instead of on Communist
terms. _We_, not they, would select the time and place for a test
of wills. _We_, not they, would have the opportunity to bring
maximum strength to bear on that test. _They_, not we, would have to
decide between fighting for limited objectives under unfavorable
circumstances, or backing down. And these are immense advantages.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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