The Crisis of Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-One in the Government of the United States.: Its Cause, and How It Should Be MetStreight, Abel D.
History
The Crisis of Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-One in the Government of the United States.: Its Cause, and How It Should Be Met
Streight, Abel D.
Secession; United States -- Politics and government -- 1857-1861
The constitution of the United States, then, forms a _government_, not a
league; and whether it be formed by compact between the States, or in any
other manner, its character is the same. It is a government, in which all
the people are represented, which operates directly on the people
individually, not upon the States; they retained all the power they did
not grant. But each State having expressly parted with so many powers, as
to constitute jointly with the other States a single nation, cannot from
that period possess any right to secede, because such secession does not
break a league, but destroys the unity of a nation; and any injury to that
unity is not only a breach, which would result from the contravention of a
compact, but it is an offence against the whole Union. To say that any
State may at pleasure secede from the Union, is to say that the United
States are not a nation; because it would be a solecism to contend, that
any part of a nation might dissolve its connection with the other parts,
to their injury or ruin, without committing any offence. Secession, like
any other revolutionary act, may be morally justified by the extremity of
oppression; but to call it a constitutional right, is confounding the
meaning of terms; and can only be done through gross error, or to deceive
those, who are willing to assert a right, but would pause before they made
a revolution, or incur the penalties consequent on a failure.
Because the Union was formed by compact, it is said the parties to that
compact may, when they feel themselves aggrieved, depart from it; but it
is precisely because it is a compact, that they cannot. A compact is an
agreement, or binding obligation. It may, by its terms, have a sanction or
penalty for its breach, or it may not. If it contains no sanction, it may
be broken with no other consequence than moral guilt; if it have a
sanction, then the breach incurs the designated or implied penalty. A
league between independent nations generally has no sanction, other than a
moral one; or, if it should contain a penalty, as there is no common
superior, it cannot be enforced. A government, on the contrary, always
has a saction, express or implied; and in our case, it is both necessarily
implied, and expressly given. An attempt by force of arms to destroy a
government, is an offence, by whatever means the constitutional compact
may have been formed; and such government has the right, by the law of
self-defence, to pass acts for punishing the offender, unless that right
is modified, restrained, or resumed by the constitutional act. In our
system, although it is modified in the case of treason, yet authority is
expressly given to pass all laws necessary to carry its powers into
effect, and under this grant provision has been made for punishing acts,
which obstruct the due administration of the laws.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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