At the dawn of 1866 the desperate plight of the cause of union called for skilful generalship in four different arenas of political action. In any one of them a false move would have been fatal to success; and there was always the danger that, on so extended a front, the advocates of union might be fighting at cross purposes and so inflicting injury on each other instead of upon the enemy. It was necessary that the Imperial influence should be exerted as far as the issues at stake warranted its employment. Canada, the object of suspicion, must march warily to avoid rousing the hostile elements elsewhere. The unionists of New Brunswick should be given time to recover their position, while those of Nova Scotia should stand ready for instant co-operation. The judicious but firm attitude of the Imperial authorities was a material factor in the {109} situation. From 1862 onwards there was no mistaking the policy of Downing Street, as expressed by the Duke of Newcastle in that year to the governor of Nova Scotia. Colonial secretaries came and went and the complexion of British ministries changed, but the principle of union stood approved. Any proposals, however, must emanate from the colonies themselves; and, when an agreement in whole or in part should be reached, the proper procedure was indicated. 'The most satisfactory mode,' said the dispatch of 1862, 'of testing the opinion of the people of British North America would probably be by means of resolution or address proposed in legislatures of each province by its own government.' This course all the governments had kept in mind, with the additional safeguard that the ministers of the day had associated with themselves the leaders of the parliamentary oppositions. Nothing could have savoured less of partisanship than the Quebec Conference; and Mr Cardwell, the colonial secretary, had acknowledged the resolutions of that body in handsome terms. The home authorities faced the difficulties with a statesmanlike front. They had no disposition to dictate, but, once assured that a {110} substantial majority in each consenting province supported the scheme, it was their duty to speak plainly, no matter how vehemently a section of opinion in England or in the provinces protested. They held the opinion, that since the provinces desired to remain within the Empire, they must combine. All the grounds for this belief could not be publicly stated. It was one of those exceptional occasions when Downing Street, by reason of its superior insight into foreign affairs and by full comprehension of the danger then threatening, knew better than the man on the spot. The colonial opposition might be sincere and patriotic, but it was wrong. Heed could not be paid to the agitations in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick because they were founded upon narrow conceptions of statesmanship and erroneous information.