If now we examine more closely, we find that there is a sound principle at the core of Rousseau's doctrine, but that the sentence 'war is merely a relation between the belligerent states and their contending forces' is an empty, untenable phrase. The sound central principle is that in fact, according to modern conceptions, war is a struggle between the belligerent states, carried on by means of their military and naval forces, and that their subjects can only be attacked or taken prisoners so far as they take part in hostilities, and that, if they behave quietly and peaceably, they are spared harsh treatment as far as possible. But to assume on that account that a war in which his state is engaged does not affect a subject, and that he is not brought thereby into hostile relations to the other side so long as he abstains from any active part in hostilities--this deals a blow in the face to all the actual facts of war. Certainly, a peaceable subject does enjoy exemption from avoidable severities, but he is none the less the object of coercive measures. If at the outbreak of a war he be resident in the territory of the enemy, cannot he be expelled? If he contribute to a loan raised by the enemy, will not his own state punish him for treason? Is it not the law of many states that if they go to war, an end is put to peaceful intercourse, and especially commercial intercourse, between their own subjects and the subjects of the enemy state? Must not the private person submit to requisitions, pay contributions, endure limitations on his freedom of movement, and obey the commands of the hostile occupant? Is not his property on many occasions--for example, during a siege or a bombardment, or on the field of battle--destroyed without compensation? Must he not, if his fatherland is completely conquered and annexed by the enemy, reconcile himself to becoming a subject of the enemy? Whoever has lived in a district occupied by an enemy knows what an empty phrase the assertion is, that war is not a hostile relation between a belligerent state and the subjects of its enemy. Yet the phrase, nevertheless, wanders from book to book and from mouth to mouth, and must always be available whenever wanted in order to justify some assertion which contradicts the recognized rules of warfare. The kernel of truth in Rousseau's doctrine is this, that while the soldier is put in an actively hostile position, the peaceable subject of a belligerent is put in a passively hostile position; but the doctrine is absolutely misunderstood, although the distinction which it asserts is quite commonly recognized. And so here also it must be repeated that, if we are to arrive at clearness, if baseless claims are not to appear under the cover of law, the phrase 'War is only a relation between the belligerent states and their contending forces' must disappear, as being misleading, from the science of international law.