The heart of the railroad problem: The history of railway discrimination in the United States, the chief efforts at control and the remedies proposed, with hints from other countriesParsons, Frank
History
The heart of the railroad problem: The history of railway discrimination in the United States, the chief efforts at control and the remedies proposed, with hints from other countries
Parsons, Frank
Railroads -- Freight -- Rates -- United States; Railroads and state -- United States
In the Texas and Pacific Case the record showed that books, buttons,
carpets, clothing, etc., were carried from England, via New Orleans to
San Francisco for $1.07 a hundred, while the same articles of domestic
manufacture paid $2.88 on the same trains from New Orleans to Frisco.
Boots and shoes, cashmere, confectionery, cutlery, gloves, hats and
caps, laces and linens, etc., took the same blanket rate of $1.07 from
Liverpool and London to San Francisco, while similar American goods paid
the railroads $3.70 a hundred from New Orleans to California. In some
cases the railroads received only ⅙ as much for the transportation of
foreign goods as for domestic goods. The Interstate Commission held that
“any difference in charge between foreign and domestic traffic is
unlawful,” and ordered the discrimination to cease, but after long
litigation the United States Supreme Court decided that among the
circumstances and conditions to be considered in judging rates are the
conditions of ocean traffic and water competition to interior ports in
the United States, etc., so that a carrier may be justified in making
low rates to secure foreign freights which would otherwise go by
competitive routes or not go at all.[114] The practical result appears
to be that railroads may nullify the protective tariff and discriminate
in favor of foreign shipments to any extent that is necessary to make
them move, regardless of the question whether or no they ought to move
under such conditions.
Foreign manufacturers cannot only ship their goods across the country
more cheaply than our manufacturers can, or at least such of them as pay
schedule rates, but can also get special rates on all raw materials they
buy here and ship over our lines for export. For example, a Chicago
miller pays 21 cents per one hundred lbs. to get either wheat or flour
to New York, while the English miller can buy wheat in Chicago and take
it to New York for 13 cents. In some cases the rate on flour has been as
much as 11 cents more than the rate on wheat. Since 2 or 3 cents a
hundred lbs. is a good profit, our millers cannot grind for export
against the English millers.[115] The railroads turn down our millers
and establish a protective tariff for free trade England, protecting her
millers against competition.
American shippers take such advantage of the low export rates as they
can, but sometimes these concessions are made to the shippers in one
city and not to those of other cities; for example, the railroads
carrying export flour from Minneapolis at a discount refused similar
concessions to shippers at intermediate points.[116]
CHAPTER XIV.
LOCALITY DISCRIMINATIONS.
Discriminations between localities, though less pronounced in this
period than in the first, were nevertheless multitudinous and vital.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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