The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
No impartial student of the history of the war can doubt that Colonel
Dodge here touches the very marrow of the matter. In the operations in
Virginia the North had more men, often by two or three to one, more
guns and incalculably better supply departments. Their men were as
good as the Southerners. Their guns were better, and their materials
immeasurably superior both in quantity and quality. But until Grant was
summoned from the West in 1864 to take command, the Army of the Potomac
was commanded by no general who had capacity enough to make effective
use of these superior advantages in a contest of strategic wits with
Lee.
The real problem which the Washington authorities were set to solve was
to find a general equal to this task, and so long as Halleck remained
commander in chief of the Federal forces, there was no hope of success
in that search. Commander after commander had been set up only to be
promptly and disastrously bowled down again by Lee, in spite of the
enormous disparity of numbers, guns and equipment.
But neither Grant nor Sherman was among those who had been appointed to
try conclusions with Lee.
Halleck was still supreme as the military counselor of Mr. Lincoln.
Grant, in spite of his victories, was a peculiarly objectionable person
to him, and Sherman labored under the serious disability of enjoying
Grant's favor and esteem in a very high degree.
But after Burnside's failure it was necessary to find a new commander
for the Army of the Potomac, and Mr. Lincoln selected General Joseph
Hooker to make the next attempt.
General Hooker was an old army officer. He was thoroughly equipped so
far as military education was concerned, and he was so ardent in the
work of the soldier that his men had lovingly nicknamed him "Fighting
Joe Hooker." But he had never commanded an army or planned a campaign.
He had made the last and most brilliant of that series of heroic
charges up Marye's Heights which Burnside had so foolishly ordered at
Fredericksburg. He had made the charge under protest, correctly deeming
it a needless sacrifice of men's lives in a hopeless undertaking. But
he had made it with extraordinary gallantry and had persisted in it
until, as he sarcastically said, "he thought he had lost as many men as
he was ordered to lose."
Of his devotion as a soldier, and of his unusual capacity in
subordinate command, he had given adequate proof in every battle
in which the Army of the Potomac had been engaged, from Manassas
to Fredericksburg. But his capacity to lead a great army against a
great enemy was wholly conjectural. Mr. Lincoln suggested this in the
extraordinary letter in which he announced to Hooker his selection for
this supreme trust. That letter was as follows:
Executive Mansion, Washington,
D. C., January 26, 1863
Major-General Hooker:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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