The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 2 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
In consultation with Stonewall Jackson--the two being seated upon
cracker boxes abandoned in Hooker's retirement--it was decided to take
a supreme risk in face of a supreme danger. With 39,000 men facing
120,000, it was decided to divide the smaller army and send Jackson,
with 22,000 men upon an expedition, the purpose of which was to strike
like a lightning flash at Hooker's right flank and rear, while Lee,
with the little remnant of his army, 17,000 in all, should so far
occupy Hooker in front as to prevent him from detaching troops for the
timely reinforcement of his threatened wing.
The results that followed this operation have been and still are a
subject of bitter controversy. Hooker tried afterwards to throw the
blame for the disaster which ensued upon Howard, Sickles and his other
lieutenants. They in turn disclaimed that responsibility and insisted
that the disaster was due solely to Hooker's own orders and to his
neglect of obvious duty as commanding general. The skilled military
critics who have since written of the campaign have taken one side
or the other of this purely personal controversy, according to their
lights of knowledge, or their darkenings of prejudice. These things
belong to biography. It is the function of the historian merely to tell
the story of what happened and to that task alone the present writer
addresses himself.
Lee and Jackson decided, as they sat there on the cracker boxes, that
Jackson, with 22,000 men, should undertake to turn Hooker's right flank
and assail him in rear, while Lee with 17,000 men should fully occupy
him by a threat of front attack, and that if Jackson's movement should
succeed, his part of the army should force its way to a junction with
Lee. Failing that, the two parts of the army must of course retreat
in the not very confident hope of uniting again at Gordonsville and
together falling back to the defenses of Richmond. For Stuart with the
Confederate cavalry had utterly broken up and defeated that part of
Hooker's plan which had contemplated Stoneman's sweep to Hanover Court
House and the entrenching of his force there as an obstacle in the way
of Lee's retreat.
On Saturday, May 2, 1863, at daylight, or a little before, Lee and
Jackson began the execution of their daring stratagem.
Hooker's headquarters were at Chancellorsville. His line stretched
eastward and northeastward to the river and westward to a region of
high ground unassailable from the front, where his right lay "in the
air," in military phrase, that is to say with no natural obstacle, such
as a river or a mountain, to defend it. It was Jackson's purpose to
march westward on a route parallel with Hooker's line, turn its western
end and strike it in flank and rear.
To accomplish that he must completely separate his 22,000 men from
Lee's 17,000 and take the chances of battle for a reuniting of the two
forces.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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