It is theologically certain that Lucifer held a very high rank in the celestial hierarchy, and it is evident that he maintains some kind of sovereignty over those who followed him in his rebellion: “Si autem,” says Our Lord, “et Satanas in seipsum diuisus est quomodo stabit regnum eius?” (If Satan also be divided against himself, how shall his kingdom stand?) And S. Paul speaks of “Principem potestatis æris huius, qui nunc operatur in filios diffidentiæ.” (The Prince of the power of this air, who now worketh in the sons of disobedience) Ephesians ii. 2. It may seem strange that those rebellious spirits who rose against their Maker should be subordinate to and obey one of their fellows who led them to destruction, but this in itself is a proof that Lucifer is a superior intelligence, and the knowledge of the angels would show them that they can effect more mischief and evil by co-operation and organization, although their unifying principle is the bond of hate, than by anarchy and division. There can be little doubt that among their ranks are many mean and petty spirits[5]—to speak comparatively—but even these can influence and betray foolish and arrogant men. We shall be on safe ground if we follow the opinion of Suarez, who would allow Lucifer to have been the highest of all angels negatively, i.e. that no one was higher, although many (and among these the three great Archangels, S. Michael, S. Gabriel, S. Raphael) may have been his equals. It has been argued that the highest of the angels, by reason of their greater intellectual illumination, must have entirely realized the utter impossibility of attaining to equality with God. So S. Anselm, _De Casu Diaboli_ (IV), says: “Non enim ita obtusæ mentis [diabolus] erat, ut nihil aliud simile Deo cogitari posse nesciret?” (The devil was surely not so dull of understanding as to be ignorant of the inconceivability of any other entity like to God?) And S. Thomas writes, in answer to the question, whether the Devil desired to be “as God,” “if by this we mean equality with God, then the Devil would not desire it, since he knew this to be impossible.” But as the Venerable Duns Scotus, Doctor subtilis, admirably points out, we must distinguish between efficacious volition and the volition of complaisance, and by the latter act an angel could desire that which is impossible. In the same way he shows that, though a creature cannot directly will its own destruction, it may do this _consequenter_, i.e. it can will something from which this would inevitably follow.