One of the most important differences between human and animal
consciousness comes to light in the appearance of “meaning” which is
a differentiating characteristic of _personal_ consciousness. We pass
“a great divide” when we pass from bare sensory experience, common to
all higher animals, to _consciousness of “meaning,”_ which is a trait
common only to persons. We all know what it is to hear words which
make a clear impression and which yet arouse no “meaning.” We often
gaze at objects and yet, like Macbeth, have “no speculation in our
eyes”—we apprehend no significant “meaning” in the thing upon which we
are looking. We sometimes catch ourselves in the very act of passing
from mere sense or bare image to the higher level of “meaning.” While
we gaze or while we listen we suddenly feel the “meaning” flood in and
transform the whole content of consciousness. All the higher ranges of
experience depend on this unique feature which is something over and
above the mere sensory stage. The words, “the quality of mercy is not
strain’d” remain just word-sounds until in a flash one sees that mercy
is “not something that comes out grudgingly in drops,” and then the mind
rises to “a consciousness of meaning.”[12] In this higher experience,
“meaning” stands vividly in the focus of consciousness and, in a case,
for instance, of grasping a long sentence, or of appreciating a piece
of music, consciousness of “meaning” is an integral unitary whole.
Now there is no corresponding unitary whole in the brain which could
stand as the physical correlate to this consciousness of “meaning.” The
simple sensational experiences correspond in some way to parallel brain
processes but these elemental experiences are merely cues which evoke
higher forms of psychical “meaning,” that have no physical or mechanical
correlate in the brain.
This is still more strikingly the case in the higher forms of memory.
The lower and more mechanical forms of memory may be treated as a
habit-sequence, linked up with permanent brain paths. But memory proper
depends, as does “meaning,” upon a single act of mental apprehension. As
McDougall well says: “the whole process and effect, the apprehension and
the retention and the remembering, are absolutely unique and distinct
from all other apprehensions and retentions and rememberings.”[13] The
higher kind of memory involves “meaning” and, the moment “meaning” floods
in, vast and complicated wholes of experience tend to become a permanent
possession, while only with multitudinous repetitions can we fix and keep
processes that are meaningless and without psychical significance. But
here once more this higher unitary consciousness of a remembered whole of
experience has no assignable physical correlate in the brain-processes.
Certain sensory cues evoke or recall a synthetic whole of consciousness
which has no parallel in the material world.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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