The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
Now the _representation_ of the independence of the _Ego_ and that of
the Thing can very well exist together; but not the independence
_itself_ of both. Only one can be the first, the beginning, the
independent; the second, by the very fact of being the second, becomes
necessarily dependent upon the first, with which it is to be
connected—now, which of the two is to be made the first? Reason
furnishes no ground for a decision; since the question concerns not the
connecting of one link with another, but the commencement of the first
link, which as an absolute first act is altogether conditional upon the
freedom of Thinking. Hence the decision is arbitrary; and since this
arbitrariness is nevertheless to have a cause, the decision is dependent
upon _inclination_ and _interest_. The last ground, therefore, of the
difference between the Dogmatist and the Idealist is the difference of
their interest.
The highest interest, and hence the ground of all other interest, is
that which we feel _for ourselves_. Thus with the Philosopher. Not to
lose his Self in his argumentation, but to retain and assert it, this is
the interest which unconsciously guides all his Thinking. Now, there are
two grades of mankind; and in the progress of our race, before the last
grade has been universally attained, two chief kinds of men. The one
kind is composed of those who have not yet elevated themselves to the
full feeling of their freedom and absolute independence, who are merely
conscious of themselves in the representation of outward things. These
men have only a desultory consciousness, linked together with the
outward objects, and put together out of their manifoldness. They
receive a picture of their Self only from the Things, as from a mirror;
for their own sake they cannot renounce their faith in the independence
of those things, since they exist only together with these things.
Whatever they are they have become through the outer World. Whosoever is
only a production of the Things will never view himself in any other
manner; and he is perfectly correct, so long as he speaks merely for
himself and for those like him. The principle of the dogmatist is: Faith
in the things, for their own sake; hence, mediated Faith in their own
desultory self, as simply the result of the Things.
But whosoever becomes conscious of his self-existence and independence
from all outward things—and this men can only become by making something
of themselves, through their own Self, independently of all outward
things—needs no longer the Things as supports of his Self, and cannot
use them, because they annihilate his independence and turn it into an
empty appearance. The _Ego_ which he possesses, and which interests him,
destroys that Faith in the Things; he believes in his independence, from
inclination, and seizes it with affection. His Faith in himself is
_immediate_.
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