The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
And of what kind are the men that will strive for this
profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the
heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties,
tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the
wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men
fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the
men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their
selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your
Government and be your rulers.--And these too will be mistaken
in the expected happiness of their situation: For their
vanquished competitors of the same spirit, and from the same
motives will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their
administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to
the people.
Besides these evils, Sir, tho' we may set out in the beginning
with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of
long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed
augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more
to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give
more to them. Hence as all history informs us, there has been in
every State & Kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the
Governing & Governed; the one striving to obtain more for its
support, and the other to pay less. And this has alone
occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either
in dethroning of the Princes, or enslaving of the people.
Generally indeed the ruling power carries its point, the
revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they
are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the
people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the
greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his
partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all
resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is
scarce a king in an hundred who would not, if he could, follow
the example of Pharoah, get first all the people's money, then
all their lands, and then make them and their children servants
for ever. It will be said, that we don't propose to establish
Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind
to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from
Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than
five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among
Citizens, and that they like. I am apprehensive therefore,
perhaps too apprehensive, that the Government of these States,
may in future times, end in a Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I
think may be long delayed, if in our proposed System we do not
sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult, by making our
posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that tho' we
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