The last Punic war, Vol. 2 (of 2) : $b Tunis, past and present : with a narrative of the French conquest of the regency.Broadley, Alexander Meyrick
History
The last Punic war, Vol. 2 (of 2) : $b Tunis, past and present : with a narrative of the French conquest of the regency.
Broadley, Alexander Meyrick
Tunisia -- History; Tunisia -- History -- French occupation, 1881-1956
Kairwán is between forty and fifty miles as the crow flies from Susa,
and the French calculate that it will be five days’ march, making due
allowance for attacks by the Arabs _en route_. After leaving Susa the
road to Kairwán for ten or twelve miles passes over hills covered with
dense olive forests; after that succeeds a wide expanse of undulating,
open country up to the very walls of the Tunisian Mecca. Water supply
there is none; the few wells at Sidi-el-Hani have been damaged by the
Arabs, and even at Susa the water obtainable is insufficient. In the
Kasbah there is an enormous well 240 ft. deep, but its contents are
unfit for drinking purposes. A large number of camels will accompany the
column, each carrying two casks containing twenty-four gallons of water.
During the march through the olive woods the French fully expect to be
severely harassed by the Arabs after the manner of their recent
reconnaissances, and, as they invariably elude pursuit, it is
apprehended that they will take advantage of the French advance into the
Kairwán plain to intercept if possible communication with the coast, or,
at any rate, to pillage the whole of the province of the Sahel between
Susa and Sfax. The district of Susa proper alone contains fifty-three
populous villages, including Kala Grande and Mesaken, the latter being
larger than Susa itself, and the Sheikhs of these villages have informed
the nominal governor of that place that as soon as the French column has
passed westwards the insurgents will devastate their farms and carry off
the remnant of their cattle. It must also be remembered that in a
strategic point of view the seaports of Monastir and Mehdia are quite as
important as Susa, and that neither of them has been occupied. This is
quite as great a blunder as the undefended French railway turned out to
be in Northern Tunis, and which, but for the massacre of Oued Zerga,
would have been supplemented by the equally capital error of leaving the
unoccupied city of Tunis in the rear of the columns advancing southwards
on Kairwán. The expeditionary force from Tebessa will be utterly
powerless to prevent the attack of the Arabs on the Sahel, and if this
takes place (as it certainly will) and extends even to Sfax and Gabes,
the garrisons at those places can effect nothing beyond their own walls,
as they are masters of just the land they stand on, and nothing more.
The French will meet with no resistance at Kairwán itself. The
townspeople have long since arranged this with their more courageous
fellow-countrymen, who have agreed to attack the French simultaneously
at distant points, and who are now fighting at Kef and Ghardimaou and in
the valleys and defiles of Zaghouán, and who, after an obstinate
resistance in the olive groves between Susa and Mesaken, will retreat
only to carry the fire and sword along the Sahel from Susa to Gabes, and
very probably to appear before Monastir and Mehdia.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account