The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human ProgressSantayana, George
Philosophy
The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress
Santayana, George
Philosophy
No doubt Aristotle and the scholastics were often uncritical. They were
too intent on building up and buttressing their system on the broad
human or religious foundations which they had chosen for it. They nursed
the comfortable conviction that whatever their thought contained was
eternal and objective truth, a copy of the divine intellect or of the
world’s intelligible structure. A sceptic may easily deride that
confidence of theirs; their system may have been their system and
nothing more. But the way to proceed if we wish to turn our shrewd
suspicions and our sense of insecurity into an articulate conviction and
to prove that they erred, is to build another system, a more modest one,
perhaps, which will grow more spontaneously and inevitably in the mind
out of the data of experience. Obviously the rival and critical theory
will make the same tacit claim as the other to absolute validity. If all
our ideas and perceptions conspire to reinforce the new hypothesis, this
will become inevitable and necessary to us. We shall then condemn the
other hypothesis, not indeed for having been a hypothesis, which is the
common fate of all rational and interpretative thought, but for having
been a hypothesis artificial, misleading, and false; one not following
necessarily nor intelligibly out of the facts, nor leading to a
satisfactory reaction upon them, either in contemplation or in practice.
[Sidenote: Critics disguised enthusiasts.]
Now this is in truth exactly the conviction which those malicious
psychologists secretly harboured. Their critical scruples and
transcendental qualms covered a robust rebellion against being fooled by
authority. They rose to abate abuses among which, as Hobbes said, “the
frequency of insignificant speech is one.” Their psychology was not
merely a cathartic, but a gospel. Their young criticism was sent into
the world to make straight the path of a new positivism, as now, in its
old age, it is invoked to keep open the door to superstition. Some of
those reformers, like Hobbes and Locke, had at heart the interests of a
physical and political mechanism, which they wished to substitute for
the cumbrous and irritating constraints of tradition. Their criticism
stopped at the frontiers of their practical discontent; they did not
care to ask how the belief in matter, space, motion, God, or whatever
else still retained their allegiance, could withstand the kind of
psychology which, as they conceived, had done away with individual
essences and nominal powers. Berkeley, whose interests lay in a
different quarter, used the same critical method in support of a
different dogmatism; armed with the traditional pietistic theory of
Providence he undertook with a light heart to demolish the whole edifice
which reason and science had built upon spatial perception. He wished
the lay intellect to revert to a pious idiocy in the presence of Nature,
lest consideration of her history and laws should breed “mathematical
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