Much has been said, by weak persons, respecting the justice of thus annulling a truce which had been actually signed before his lordship's arrival. They know little of this great and honourable man, the glory of human nature, as well as of his country, who can for a moment conceive that any part of Lord Nelson's character, public or private, need shrink from the severest scrutiny to which the actions of terrestrial beings may with justice be subjected. He was, it is maintained, among the best, as well as the bravest, among the most just, as well as the most judicious, of mankind. With regard to the right which his lordship possessed of putting an end to the armistice, notwithstanding the capitulation had been signed, while the castles remained unsurrendered, a few plain words will be allowed sufficient, by the sober part of mankind, for whom they can, indeed, scarcely be necessary, to set the question at rest for ever. Had the French fleet arrived, instead of the British, would the capitulation have been at all regarded by those who had agreed to surrender these castles? Would they have delivered them up to the then overpowered besiegers? On the contrary, would they not have instantly directed the guns of these very fortresses against the persons to whom they had just signed their submission? These questions are so obvious, that they scarcely need any reply, since there cannot possibly be two opinions on the subject. If there exists, in such derogations, any departure from strictly moral justice, which admits of much doubt, it must be ascribed to the rigorous necessities inseparable from a state of war, and not to any want of rectitude in the breasts of those honourable men on whom devolves the severe task of dictating the operations of that dreadful but unavoidable chastiser of the human race. The besieged, by the laws of war, would have had a right to avail themselves, as is suggested, in the case of such an arrival of the French fleet; and, unquestionably, that of the British, which actually occurred, was alike entitled to alter the effect of the unexecuted capitulation. It appears, however, that Lord Nelson, though he would not sanction an armistice which he considered as dishonouring the sovereign for whom he was acting, had not the smallest desire to interfere with the disposal of the rebels whom he was so anxious to secure. It was not for their punishment, but for the security of those whom he feared they might contaminate by their principles, that he resolved to keep them in safe custody till the farther pleasure of his Sicilian Majesty should be known; and, in this, even Cardinal Ruffo, it seems, at length, reluctantly acquiesced.