The _Stosstruppen_, obliged, like the ordinary troops, to attack in too serried ranks, offer a splendid target to artillery and machine-guns and, nine times out of ten, their rush is stopped before they can engage in a hand-to-hand fight. [Illustration: La Bovelle May 5, 1917--10.30 A.M.] We wonder what the German divisions on the Russian Front will be able to accomplish without their best and strongest elements when the Russian Army rallies and re-enters the war in earnest. =3. Mission and use of the infantry in a division.= We have stated that a division includes three or four regiments. We will now dwell on the disposition of a division comprising two brigades of two regiments each. It seems certain that this is the type that will be adopted by the American Army, which possesses a sufficient number of men for this normal constitution of a division. _Front of a division._ The front of a division in trench warfare is very variable in extent. The occupation of strong intrenchments, enabling the reserves to be sheltered from the enemy’s fire, allows of the extension of the front, especially if the army remains on the defensive. As soon as a division takes the offensive, however, its front is reduced to such proportions as will permit of energetic effort. The front of a division in the open field has been fixed at 1800 to 2000 metres. The operations in 1914 showed that the fronts were always longer than this and often twice as long and such will perhaps continue to be the case in future if the war in the open is resumed; but, so long as the war remains one of intrenchments, it will be very dangerous not to limit the fronts, especially at the time of an offensive. This is an acknowledged truth, and there is a growing tendency, especially in the British Army, to shorten the front of attack of a division. DISPOSITIONS. The most logical mode of disposing the troops in a division on the battlefield will always consist in the junction of the two brigades side by side, and, in the brigades, the junction of the regiments side by side. The division, the brigade, the regiment, and even the battalion, have each to constitute reserves either to ensure success or to guard against possible failures in their offensive. In this warfare of position, even more perhaps than in one of movement, the necessity of always having troops near at hand, ready to repel counter-attacks, is imperative, owing to the fact that every repulse is followed by the enemy’s occupation of a part of the line of defence which would have to be retaken later with great losses should the enemy be given time to organize themselves therein. [Illustration: North of La Bovelle April 24, 1917--10 A.M.] The disposition of the units in depth enables the Command, when the lines are cleverly constructed and their intercommunications well assured, to keep only a few men in the severely bombarded spots, and to shelter the largest part of the troops where they cannot be injured.