After reconnoitering the post myself, and collecting all the information I could get of its strength and situation, I found that, without hazarding a greater loss than we were able to afford, and with little likelihood of success, the attempt to carry it could only be by way of surprize. I therefore resolved on this mode, and gave my instructions to General Wayne accordingly, in hopes that Verplanck's Point might fall in consequence of the reduction of the other. Dispositions were made for the purpose, which unluckily did not succeed. The evening appointed for the attack, I directed Major-General McDougall to put two brigades under marching orders to be moved down toward Verplanck's, as soon as he should receive intelligence of the success of the attempt on this side, and requested General Wayne to let his despatches to me pass through General McDougall, that he might have the earliest advice of the event. But by some misconception, they came directly to headquarters, which occasioned a loss of several hours. The next morning Major-General Howe was sent to take the command of those troops, with orders to advance to the vicinity of the enemy's works, and open batteries against them. I was in hopes that this might either awe them, under the impression of what had happened on the other side, to surrender, or prepare the way for an assault. But some accidental delays, in bringing on the heavy cannon and intrenching tools necessary for an operation of this kind, unavoidably retarded its execution, till the approach of the enemy's main body made it too late. General Howe, to avoid being intercepted, found himself under the necessity of relinquishing his project and returning to a place of security. I did not unite the two attacks at the same time and in the same manner, because this would have rendered the enterprize more complex, more liable to suspicion, and less likely to succeed for want of an exact co-operation, which could hardly have been expected. When I came to examine the post at Stony Point, I found it (p. 018) would require more men to maintain it than we could afford, without incapacitating the army for other operations. In the opinion of the engineer, corresponding with my own and that of all the general officers present, not less than fifteen hundred men would be requisite for its defence; and, from the nature of the works, which were opened toward the river, a great deal of labour and expense must have been incurred, and much time employed to make them defensible by us. The enemy, depending on their shipping to protect their rear, had constructed the works solely against an attack by land. We should have had to apprehend equally an attack by water, and must have inclosed the post.