or during absorption in some conception or in some thought, just in our happiest moments, may be partially or wholly absent. We shall then gladly renounce individual immortality, and shall not place more value upon the accessory elements than upon the principal. We shall in this way arrive at a freer and a _more enlightened_ conception of life, which will exclude the neglect of other egos and the over-estimation of our own. * * * * * If, now, the knowledge of the connection of the elements (sensations) does not suffice us, and we must ask _Who_, _What_, possesses this connection of sensations, _Who_, _What_, perceives sensations? we have succumbed, we may be sure, to our old habit of arranging every element (every sensation) within some _unanalysed_ complex, and we are falling back imperceptibly to an older, lower, and more limited point of view. * * * * * The habit of treating the unanalysed ego-complex as an indivisible unity is often scientifically presented in peculiar ways. First, the nervous system is separated from the body as the seat of sensations. In the nervous system again the brain is selected as fitted for the performance of this function, and finally, to save the pretended psychical _unity_, a further _point_ is sought in the brain as the seat of the soul. But rough conceptions like these are hardly adapted to trace out even in the crudest lines the ways that future research will follow in investigating the connection of the physical and the psychical. The fact that the different organs of sensation and memory are physically _connected_ with one another, and can be easily _excited_ by one another is probably the foundation of the "psychical unity." I once heard the question seriously discussed of "How the percept of a very large tree found room in the little head of a man?" Now though this "problem" does not exist, yet we perceive by the question the absurdity that is so easily committed in conceiving sensations to exist spacially in the brain. When I speak of the sensations of _another_ person, these sensations of course present no activity in my optical space or my physical space generally; they are mentally added, and I conceive them to be _causally_ annexed, not spacially, to the brain observed or represented. When I speak of _my_ sensations, these sensations do not exist spacially in my head, but rather my "head" _shares_ with them the same spacial field, as was explained above (compare what was said regarding the cut). * * * * * Let there be no mention of the so-called unity of consciousness. Since the apparent opposition of the _real_ and the _perceived_ world exists only in the mode according to which it is viewed, and no real chasm exists, a multiplex interconnected content of consciousness is in no respect more difficult to understand than the multiplex interconnection of the world.