The Navy as a Fighting MachineFiske, Bradley A. (Bradley Allen)
History
The Navy as a Fighting Machine
Fiske, Bradley A. (Bradley Allen)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Navies; Sea-power; United States. Navy -- Management
the Pacific side, knowing that we should need all our navy on the
Atlantic side. This seems to mean that in order to have an effective
naval defense (since we are precluded by our policy from having
European allies and no South American country could give us any
effective naval help) we must have on each ocean a fleet as strong
as that of any nation on that ocean against whose wishes we may
have to enforce a policy--or against whose policy we may have to
oppose resistance.
The essential requirement of any defense is that it shall be adequate;
because an inadequate defense will be broken down, while the attack
will retain a large proportion of its original strength. In the
_United States Naval Institute_, in 1905, the present writer showed,
by means of a series of tables, how, when two forces fight, the
force which is originally the more powerful will become gradually
more powerful, relatively to the weaker, as the fight goes on. That,
for instance, if two forces start with the relative powers of 10 and
8, the weaker force will be reduced so much more rapidly than the
stronger that when it has been reduced to zero the stronger force
will have a value of 5.69. The values mentioned indicated the actual
fighting strength--strength made up of all the factors--material,
physical, and psychic--that constituted it. Of course, none of
these factors can ever be accurately compared; but nevertheless
the tables seemed to prove that in a contest between two forces
whose total strengths are as 10 and 8 one force will be reduced
to zero, while the other will be reduced not quite one-half.
One of the lessons drawn was "the folly of ineffectual resistance."
Doubtless a clearer lesson would have been "the folly of ineffectual
preparedness"; because, when the decision as to resistance or
non-resistance is forced upon a nation, the matter is so urgent,
the military, political, and international conditions so complex,
and the excitement probably so intense, that a wise decision is
very difficult to reach; whereas the question of what constitutes
effectual preparedness is simple, and needs merely to be approached
with calm nerves and an open mind.
Inasmuch as the psychic element in defense is the strongest single
element, it is apparent that if the decision is reached to prepare
an effectual defense the nation must be absolutely united, and
must appreciate at its full value the debilitating influence of
opposition to the measure; for, no matter how much money a nation
may expend, no matter how many lives it may sacrifice, its defense
cannot have an efficiency proportional to the effort if a considerable
number of its citizens are permitted to oppose it.
In our own country there has been so much talking and writing recently
about defense, that there is danger of the question coming to be
considered academic; though no question is more practical, no question
is more urgent.
_Defense must defend_.
CHAPTER VI
NAVAL POLICY
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