The Navy as a Fighting MachineFiske, Bradley A. (Bradley Allen)
History
The Navy as a Fighting Machine
Fiske, Bradley A. (Bradley Allen)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Navies; Sea-power; United States. Navy -- Management
Another event which had happened shortly before showed that naval
policies would have to be modified, if they were to utilize recent
advances in scientific methods. This event was the unprecedented
success at target practice of H. M. S. _Terrible_, commanded by
Captain Sir Percy Scott, which proved that by a long and strenuous
training and the adoption of instruments of precision, it was possible
to attain a skill in naval gunnery never attained before. Up to this
moment the British navy had almost despised gunnery. Inheriting the
traditions brought down from Howe, Rodney, and Nelson, permeated with
the ideals of the "blue-water school," proud of being British seamen,
proud of the pure white of their ships, enamoured of the stimulating
breeziness of the quarterdeck and bridge, imbued with almost a
contempt for such mathematical sciences as were not directly used
in practical navigation, British naval officers exalted seamanship
as the acme of their art, and took little interest in gunnery.
All the battles of the past had been won by dash and seamanship
and dogged persistence. Ships had always fought close alongside
each other. No science had ever won any naval battle of the past,
so why should they bother with science now--and why should they
bother with target practice, except just enough to insure that the
battery was in order, and that the men were not afraid of their
guns? Besides, target practice dirtied the ship--a sacrilege to
the British naval officer.
But the events of the war between Japan and Russia, especially
the naval battles of Port Arthur, August 10, 1904, and the Sea
of Japan, May 27, 1905, riveted their attention on the fact that
something more than seamanship and navigation and clean ships would
be needed, if the British navy was to maintain its proud supremacy
on the sea; for in these battles, overwhelming victories were won
purely by superior skill in gunnery, strategy, and tactics.
To these causes of awakening was added one still greater, but of
like import--the rapid rise of the German navy from a position
of comparative unimportance to one which threatened the British
navy itself. The fact became gradually evident to British officers
that the German navy was proceeding along the same lines as had
proceeded the German army. Realizing the efficiency of the German
Government, noting the public declarations of the German Emperor,
observing the excellence of the German ships, the skill of the
German naval officers, and the extraordinary energy which the German
people were devoting to the improvement of the German navy--the
British navy took alarm.
So did the other navies.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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