And, first, I venture to contest the main doctrines on which the criticism of the Order rests.[32] I deny that a belligerent nation has been _conceded_ ‘the right of visit and search, and the right of capture and condemnation’ of neutral ships engaged in unneutral service or carrying contraband for the enemy. I deny that a belligerent nation has been _conceded_ ‘the right to establish and maintain a blockade of an enemy’s ports and coasts and to capture and condemn any vessel taken in trying to break the blockade.’ On the contrary, I assert that these are _belligerent rights_ which may be _asserted_ and exercised against the neutral merchant whose vessels are engaged in rendering those services to the enemy: that consequently ‘a nation’s sovereignty over its own ships and citizens under its own flag on the high seas’ does suffer ‘diminution in times of war’ to the full extent to which a belligerent exercises those rights: and that to this extent ‘the equality of sovereignty on the high seas’ finds no place in war. And I further contend that the proposition, to the establishment of which all the argument of the Protest tends--that ‘innocent shipments may be freely transported to and from the United States through neutral countries to belligerents’ territory’ without risk of seizure and confiscation--is not true when one of the belligerent Governments has declared its intention of stopping all shipments, and has taken effective steps to enforce that intention. If the proposition were true in these circumstances the Order in Council would be a breach of international law. _Application of the Law of Vendor and Purchaser_ Before making good this position a preliminary point raised by the Protest must be dealt with--the bearing of the Declaration of Paris on the question. Even the learned must have been somewhat confused by the isolated, almost casual, reference to one of its rules--‘Free ships make free goods’; or to be more accurate, ‘The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, with the exception of contraband of war.’ Its relation to the context is more than obscure, for this rule applies to the seizure of _enemy property_, whereas the doctrines on which the law of contraband and the law of blockade rest apply to the seizure of _neutral property_. It is clear, therefore, that there are two very distinct planes of thought, and we cannot step lightly from one to the other without putting in peril the logical structure of the discussion. ‘The rules of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, among them that free ships make free goods, will hardly at this day be disputed by the signatories of that solemn agreement.’