The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and WrongBrentano, Franz
Philosophy
The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong
Brentano, Franz
Ethics
I conclude with a curiosity recently furnished by Steinthal in his
_Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie_ (chap. xviii. p. 175). I there
read with astonishment: “Brentano’s confusion in completely severing
judgments from idea and thoughts (!) and grouping the judgments as
acts of recognition or rejection, with love and hate (!!) is instantly
removed if such (?) a judgment, as an aesthetic judgment is termed
“Beurteilen” (!). Probably Steinthal has never once glanced into my
_Psychology_, and has only read Windelband’s statement concerning it;
this, however, so hastily that I hope he will not be ungrateful at my
sending his lines to Windelband for correction.
[23] (_p. 14_). Miklosich, _Subjectlose Sätze_, second edition,
Vienna, 1883.
In order to make the reader familiar with the contents of this
valuable little book a notice written at the time for the _Vienna
Evening Post_ may prove useful. Through an oversight it was printed
as a feuilleton in the Vienna newspaper. As no one certainly would
look for it there, I will include it here by way of an appendix.
Meantime, Sigwart’s monograph, _The Impersonalia_ has appeared, in
which he opposes Miklosich. Marty has submitted this, as well as
(shortly before) the corresponding section in Sigwart’s _Logic_ to a
telling criticism in the _Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche
Philosopie_, with regard to which criticism Sigwart, though without
any reasonable ground, has shown himself highly indignant. “Il se
fache,” the French say, “donc il a tort.” That Sigwart’s theory in
its essential points has not succeeded, even Steinthal really allows,
though in his _Zeitschrift_ (chap. xviii. p. 172 seq.) he burns thick
clouds of incense to the writer of the monograph, and even in his
preface to the fourth edition of his _Origin of Language_ applauds
a form of conduct which every true friend of that deserving man
(Sigwart) must regret. After the high praise awarded to him at the
outset, one feels somewhat disappointed finally by the criticism.
Steinthal rejects (pp. 177-180) Sigwart’s theory on its grammatical
side. There would only remain therefore as really successful Sigwart’s
psychological theory. But the psychological portion is not that
concerning which Steinthal’s estimate is authoritative; for in that
case, one would be bound to take seriously the following remark: “In
the proposition: “Da bückt sich’s hinunter mit liebendem Blick” (a
line from Schiller’s _Diver_), it is obvious that everybody must think
of the king’s daughter, but it is not she which stands before me but
a subjectless “sich hinunter-bücken,” and now I have all the more
fellow-feeling for her. According to my (Steinthal’s) psychology, I
should say the idea of the king’s daughter “fluctuates” (schwingt) but
does not enter into consciousness.” This calls for something more than
the old saying: _Sapienti sat_.
I
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