The Philosophy of Natural Theology: An Essay in confutation of the scepticism of the present dayJackson, William
Religion
The Philosophy of Natural Theology: An Essay in confutation of the scepticism of the present day
Jackson, William
Natural theology; Religion -- Philosophy; Religion and science
[3] Cowper, "The Task," B. III.--It must be confessed that the
honest-minded humanitarian may often find in the reception
he encounters ample reason and motive enough for taking up
Teufelsdroeckh's parable:--"'In vain thou deniest it,' says the
Professor; 'thou _art_ my Brother. Thy very hatred, thy very envy,
those foolish lies thou tellest of me in thy splenetic humour: what
is all this but an inverted sympathy? Were I a steam-engine, wouldst
thou take the trouble to tell lies of me? Not thou! I should grind all
unheeded, whether badly or well,'"--(_Sartor Resartus_, B. III. c. 7).
And when the bigotry of Unbelief is not content with persecuting the
honest-minded humanitarian--when he hears some shallow, half-animalized
specimen of humanity shouting for a red-handed communism and the blood
of the innocent--_then_ he may not irrationally exclaim with the same
philosopher:--"Wert thou, my little Brotherkin, suddenly covered up
within the largest imaginable glass-bell,--what a thing it were, not
for thyself only, but for the world!"
[g] I am indebted to Mr. Gladstone's appendix (p. 40) for the following
apposite quotations from Sir George Cornewall Lewis's very scarce
work, "On the Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion." Speaking
of "Authority, and its place not as an antagonist of Reason, but as
an instrument of Reason for the attainment of Truth," Sir George
remarks, in page 35 of his book: "'It is commonly said that the
belief is independent of the will,' and that no man can change it 'by
merely wishing it to be otherwise.' But 'the operation of a personal
interest may cause a man insensibly to adopt prejudices or partial and
unexamined opinions.' In page 38 he adds: 'Napoleon affords a striking
instance of the corruption of the judgment in consequence of the
misdirection of the moral sentiments.'"
All friends, and many casual readers, of S. T. Coleridge will
remember that he asserted the same, or perhaps a stronger, conclusion
upon metaphysical grounds, and with a force of language not easily
surpassed. This--one of Coleridge's bursts of gorgeous eloquence and
imagery--will be found in "The Friend," a book which, according to C.
Lamb, contains "his best talk." The subject commences on page 260 of
Vol. III., Ed. 2, and page 211, seq., Vol. III., Ed. 4. In the latter
place it is amplified by a summary of his arguments, pages 213, 214.
The position propounded, that true insight cannot exist apart from
moral rectitude, receives considerable light from the doctrine of
philosophical postulates maintained in the "Biographia Literaria,"
Vol. I. c. 12, and chiefly borrowed from Schelling, to whom there
is an honest reference in the first Edition, I. 250. I mention this
circumstance because Coleridge has been held guilty of unjustifiable
pillage by writers who have noted his borrowing, but omitted to observe
such acknowledgments as he makes, together with the additions and
alterations which he introduces.
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