The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity: A Modern Philosophy of Life Developed by Scientific MethodsSteiner, Rudolf
Religion
The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity: A Modern Philosophy of Life Developed by Scientific Methods
Steiner, Rudolf
Anthroposophy; Free will and determinism; Knowledge, Theory of; Life
and Idea, Book 2, § 18.) Schopenhauer considers himself entitled by
these arguments to hold that the will becomes objectified in the
human body. He believes that in the activities of the body he has
an immediate experience of reality, of the thing-in-itself in the
concrete. Against these arguments we must urge that the activities of
our body become known to us only through self-observation, and that,
as such, they are in no way superior to other percepts. If we want
to know their real nature, we can do so only by means of thought,
i.e., by fitting them into the ideal system of our concepts and ideas.
One of the most deeply rooted prejudices of the naïve mind is
the opinion that thinking is abstract and empty of any concrete
content. At best, we are told, it supplies but an "ideal" counterpart
of the unity of the world, but never that unity itself. Whoever holds
this view has never made clear to himself what a percept apart from
concepts really is. Let us see what this world of bare percepts is. A
mere juxtaposition in space, a mere succession in time, a chaos of
disconnected particulars--that is what it is. None of these things
which come and go on the stage of perception has any connection with
any other. The world is a multiplicity of objects without distinctions
of value. None plays any greater part in the nexus of the world than
any other. In order to realise that this or that fact has a greater
importance than another we must go to thought. As long as we do not
think, the rudimentary organ of an animal which has no significance
in its life, appears equal in value to its more important limbs. The
particular facts reveal their meaning, in themselves and in their
relations with other parts of the world, only when thought spins its
threads from thing to thing. This activity of thinking has always
a content. For it is only through a perfectly definite concrete
content that I can know why the snail belongs to a lower type of
organisation than the lion. The mere appearance, the percept, gives
me no content which could inform me as to the degree of perfection
of the organisation.
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