The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and EthicCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic
Croce, Benedetto
Economics; Ethics; Will
Asking ourselves now, what are the relations of this same activity with
that which seems to follow it and to be outside the spirit, in company
with corporeality, naturality, physic and matter (or however else it
may be called)? we find ourselves face to face with a problem which
we have already treated and solved in another part of the system of
the spirit, and which we shall solve here in an analogous manner. What
we may now designate as the problem of the relation between _volition
and action,_ formerly appeared in the theoretical philosophy as the
problem of the relation between _intuition_ and _expression._--Are then
volitions and actions two distinct terms that may appear now together,
now separate? Can volition remain for its part isolated from action,
whereas action is not able to separate itself from volition, or is the
opposite true?--We reply, as we did on the former occasion, by denying
the problem itself and by identifying intuition with expression,
in such a manner that effective intuition became at the same time
expression, and it was declared that a so-called expression, which was
not at the same time intuition, was declared to be non-existent.--We
reply in like manner on this occasion, that _volition and action_ are
_one,_ and that volition without action or action without volition is
inconceivable.
[Sidenote: _Spirit and nature._]
Indeed, the relation between spirit and nature (which is a general
relation, including the other particulars between intuition and
expression, or between volition and action), understood in the way
that it is here, is a relation, not between two entities, but only
between two different methods of elaborating one unique reality,
which is spiritual reality: thus it is not truly a relation. Nor are
the two modes of elaboration two co-ordinated modes of knowledge,
for that would lead back to a duplicity of objects, but the first is
cognoscitive elaboration and true science, or philosophy, in which
reality is revealed as activity and spirituality, while the other is an
abstract elaboration for practical convenience, without cognoscitive
character. When this has been posited, the spiritual act of volition
has not another reality face to face with it, with which it must join
or combine, in order to become concrete, but is itself full reality.
That which is called matter, movement, and material modification from
the naturalistic point of view, is already included in the volitional
spiritual act, of which it might be said without difficulty (as was
once said amid much scandal of the Ego) that it is heavy, round,
square, white, red, sonorous, and, therefore, physically determinable.
The volition is not followed by a movement of the legs or arms; it
is those movements themselves that are material for the physical,
spiritual for the philosopher, extrinsic for the former, at once
intrinsic and extrinsic for the latter, or better, neither extrinsic
nor intrinsic (an arbitrary division).
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