The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and EthicCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic
Croce, Benedetto
Economics; Ethics; Will
On the other hand, certain commonplaces seem to be in opposition to
the criterion itself: for example, that men are judged by success and
that it matters little what we have willed and done, when the result
is not satisfactory. There are also certain popular customs that make
individuals responsible for what happens outside their own spheres
of action, not to mention the well-known historical examples of
unfortunate leaders crucified at Carthage and guillotined at Paris, for
no other cause in reality than that of not having won the victory. And
there is also the insistence of certain thinkers upon the necessity of
never distinguishing the judgment of the act from that of the fact. But
such insistence is nothing but a new aspect of the implacable struggle
that it has been necessary to conduct against the morality of the mere
intention and against the sophisms and the subterfuges that arise from
it; an insistence that has expressed itself in paradoxical formulæ,
as are also paradoxical the trivial remarks of ordinary life that
have been mentioned. As to the customs and condemnations narrated by
history, these were without doubt extraordinary expedients in desperate
cases, in which people had placed themselves in such a position that it
was impossible or most difficult to verify intentions and actions, and
to distinguish misfortunes from betrayals; and as all expedients born
of like situations sometimes hit the mark, that is to say, punish bad
faith, so will others increase with irrationality the evil that they
would have wished to diminish, since in those cases there has not been
any bad faith to punish and to correct.
[1] _Arch. p. lo st. d. trad, pop.,_ of Pitré (1882), pp. 70-72.
[2] Thuc. ii. 64.
VI
THE PRACTICAL JUDGMENT, THE HISTORY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL
With these last considerations, we are conducted to the theory of
practical judgments, that is, to those judgments of which we have
demonstrated the impossibility, when their precedence to the volitional
act was asserted; but their conceivability as following it, indeed
their necessity, is clear, by the intrinsic law of the Spirit; which
consists in always preserving or in continually attaining to full
possession of itself.
[Sidenote: _Practical taste and judgment._]
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