These measures of Corbulo were of a hazardous kind,[34] and led to a bad complication. The Roman general may possibly have been, still more thoroughly than the statesmen in Rome, impressed by the uselessness of retaining Armenia; but, after the Roman government had installed Tigranes as king of Armenia, he could not of his own accord fall back upon the conditions earlier laid down, least of all abandon his own acquisitions and withdraw the Roman troops from Armenia. He was the less entitled to do so, as he administered Cappadocia and Armenia merely _ad interim_, and had himself declared to the government that he was not in a position to exercise the command at once there and in Syria; whereupon the consular Lucius Caesennius Paetus was nominated as governor of Cappadocia and was already on the way thither. The suspicion can hardly be avoided that Corbulo grudged the latter the honour of the final subjugation of Armenia, and wished before his arrival to establish a definitive solution by the actual conclusion of peace with the Parthians. The Roman government accordingly declined the proposals of Vologasus and insisted on the retention of Armenia, which, as the new governor who arrived in Cappadocia in the course of the summer of 61 declared, was even to be taken under direct Roman administration. Whether the Roman government had really resolved to go so far cannot be ascertained; but this was at all events implied in the consistent following out of their policy. The installing of a king dependent on Rome was only a prolongation of the previous untenable state of things; whoever did not wish the cession of Armenia to the Parthians had to contemplate the conversion of the kingdom into a Roman province. The war therefore took its course; and on that account one of the Moesian legions was sent to the Cappadocian army. [Sidenote: Measures of Paetus.]