XXXVIII. “I perceive Scipio,” said Lælius, “that you are sufficiently provided with testimony. But with me, as with good judges, sound argument prevails more than witnesses.” “Make use of an argument then,” replied Scipio, “which your knowledge of yourself can suggest to you.” “What knowledge,” said he. S. Why as when by chance it happens to you to be angry with some one. L. That occurs oftener than I could wish. S. What! when you are in anger, do you suffer your mind to fall under the domination of that passion? L. No, so help me Hercules. I rather imitate Archytas, the Tarentine; who on arriving at his country house, and being greatly offended at perceiving his orders had been disobeyed, “You are a miserable wretch,” said he to his farmer, “and I would have you flogged to death if I were not angry.” “Excellent,” said Scipio. “Archytas wished to calm his anger by reflection, considering that degree of it which was not under the control of reason, to be leading on to a sort of sedition of the mind. To it add avarice, ambition, the passion for glory, and for sensual pleasures; and it will appear that there exists in the minds of men, a sort of regal controlling power, to wit, reflection. For that is the best part of the mind, and where its authority prevails, there is no room for sensuality, for anger, or for rashness. L. So it is. S. Do you approve therefore of a mind so disposed? L. There is nothing I admire more. S. Then you really do not think, reflection being driven away; that voluptuousness or the angry passions, which are without end, should have the mastery in all things. L. Indeed I can conceive of nothing more wretched, than such a state of mind; nor of a man more debased than when under such government. S. You prefer then all parts of the mind, to be under some government, the government of reflection? L. I certainly prefer it. S. Why therefore do you hesitate in your opinion about public affairs; where if the administration is transferred to many, there will be no one, as I now understand it, to take the command. And it seems that if authority is not one thing, it is nothing at all. XXXIX. “I would ask,” said Lælius, “of what consequence it is to us, whether one or many, if justice is dispensed by the latter.” “Since I find Lælius,” said Scipio, “that my witnesses have made no great impression on you, I shall not desist from making use of yourself as a witness to prove what I say.” “Me,” said he, “in what way?” S. Why adverting to the directions you so earnestly gave to your family, when we were lately at Formianum; to obey only the orders of one person. L. Oh! my farmer! S. Well, at home, I suppose, several are entrusted with the management of your affairs? L. No, only one. S. What, your whole establishment! does no one but yourself manage it? L. Just so. S. Do not you therefore accede to the same conclusion in public affairs: that the government of a single person, if it is a just one, is the best?