The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914Pratt, Edwin A.
History
The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914
Pratt, Edwin A.
Railroads; Transportation, Military
Heavy artillery, wrote Adams, though the most formidable implement of
modern warfare, had the disadvantage of requiring many horses to draw
it. So the problem arose as to how the horses could be dispensed with.
This could best be done, he thought, by putting artillery on "our true
line of defence,--our rails," and having it drawn, or propelled, by a
locomotive. "Mount," he said, "a gun of twenty tons weight on a railway
truck, with a circular traversing platform, and capable of throwing
a shot or shell weighing one hundred to one and a half a distance of
five miles. A truck on eight wheels would carry this very easily, and
there would be no recoil." Such a battery would be "practically a
moving fortress," and, used on the coast railways, which he regarded as
constituting lines of defence, would be "the cheapest of all possible
fortresses--absolutely a continuous fortress along the whole coast."
Communication with coast railways at all strategical points should,
however, be facilitated by the placing of rails along the ordinary
highways. After giving some technical details as to the construction
alike of coast railways and road tramways, he proceeded:--
With these roads communicating with the railroads, the whole
railway system becomes applicable to military purposes.
The railway system is so especially adapted for defence, and
so little adapted to invaders, that it should become at once a
matter of experiment how best to adapt Armstrong or other guns
to its uses. The process of fitting the engines with shot-proof
walls to protect the drivers against riflemen would be very
easy.... Nothing but artillery could damage the engines or
moving batteries, and artillery could not get near them if it
were desirable to keep out of the way.
One gun transportable would do the work of ten which are
fixtures in forts, and there would be no men to take prisoners,
for no forts would be captured.
The more this system is thought of the more the conviction
will grow that it is the simplest mode of rendering the country
impenetrable to invaders at a comparatively trifling cost.
It will be seen that the scheme here proposed included three separate
propositions--(1) the use of railways, as "engines of war," for coast
defence; (2) the mounting of Armstrong or other guns on railway trucks
from which they could be discharged for the purposes of such defence;
and (3) the providing of the engines with "shot-proof walls" for the
protection of the drivers. A similar protection for the men operating
the guns on the trucks was not then, apparently, considered necessary;
but we have here what was clearly the germ of the "armoured train."
Among the other suggestions advanced on the same occasion were some for
the employment of railways in general for strategical purposes, and more
especially for the defence of London; and here, again, the employment of
armoured trains was advocated.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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