The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the SudanChurchill, Winston
History
The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan
Churchill, Winston
Sudan -- History -- 1881-1899
With the capture of the city and the death of the envoy the reason for
the expedition disappeared. It remained only to withdraw the troops. The
stores which had been brought across the desert at a terrible cost were
thrown hastily into the Nile. The battered steamers which had waited
so long at Metemma were hurriedly dismantled. The Camel Corps, their
extraordinary efforts futile and their camels killed, marched back on
foot to Korti. Their retreat was pressed by the exultant enemy. The
River Column, whose boats after months of labour had just cleared the
Cataracts, and who had gained a success at Kirbekan, were carried
back swiftly by the strong current against which they had hopefully
struggled. The whole Expeditionary Force--Guards, Highlanders, sailors,
Hussars, Indian soldiers, Canadian voyageurs, mules, camels, and
artillery--trooped back forlornly over the desert sands, and behind
them the rising tide of barbarism followed swiftly, until the whole vast
region was submerged. For several months the garrison of Kassala under
a gallant Egyptian maintained a desperate resistance, but at last famine
forced them to surrender, and they shared the fate of the garrisons
of El Obeid, Darfur, Sobat, Tokar, Sinkat, Sennar, and Khartoum. The
evacuation of the Soudan was thus completed.
CHAPTER III: THE DERVISH EMPIRE
It might seem at first a great advantage that the peoples of the Soudan,
instead of being a multitude of wild, discordant tribes, should unite of
their own accord into one strong community, actuated by a common spirit,
living under fixed laws, and ruled by a single sovereign. But there
is one form of centralised government which is almost entirely
unprogressive and beyond all other forms costly and tyrannical--the rule
of an army. Such a combination depends, not on the good faith and good
will of its constituents, but on their discipline and almost mechanical
obedience. Mutual fear, not mutual trust, promotes the co-operation of
its individual members. History records many such dominations, ancient
and modern, civilised or barbaric; and though education and culture
may modify, they cannot change their predominant characteristics--a
continual subordination of justice to expediency, an indifference to
suffering, a disdain of ethical principles, a laxity of morals, and
a complete ignorance of economics. The evil qualities of military
hierarchies are always the same. The results of their rule are
universally unfortunate. The degree may vary with time and place, but
the political supremacy of an army always leads to the formation of
a great centralised capital, to the consequent impoverishment of the
provinces, to the degradation of the peaceful inhabitants through
oppression and want, to the ruin of commerce, the decay of learning,
and the ultimate demoralisation even of the military order through
overbearing pride and sensual indulgence.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account