The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
My opinions on the Chinese, Korean, and Japanese frontiers I will, on
account of their importance, quote verbatim, where possible, from my
report:
“From the Pamirs almost to the Pacific, we march with China for 6,074
miles. China is about 4,267,000 square miles in extent, and contains
about 400,000,000 inhabitants, so that it has the largest population
in the world. The great mass of the people are Buddhists, about
20,000,000 are Mohammedans, and about 1,150,000 Christians. Our trade
with China, which has been gradually increasing during the last ten
years, has risen from £3,100,000 in 1888 to £4,560,000 in 1897.
“Notwithstanding the immense length of this frontier, our exports
are insignificant; but it is to be hoped that the railway-line
through Manchuria, with its branch to Port Arthur, will alter
this unprofitable state of affairs in our favour.[28] Although we
have had relations with China for two centuries, and although our
frontiers are identical for over 6,000 miles, they have not once
been violated by military operations. The number of troops kept in
Siberia has always been exceedingly small. This has been due to the
generally peaceful disposition of the Chinese, to the position of
the River Amur, and other natural obstacles—lofty mountain ranges
and vast steppes—and to the absence of any really close tie between
China and her subject races nearest to our frontier.
“Our occupation of the Ussuri district necessitated raising new
bodies of troops for garrison purposes. Finally, the Chino-Japanese
War and its consequences compelled us to take further and rapid
action to strengthen our forces in the Far East. This war showed
up the extreme political weakness of China on the one hand, and
the great power and energy of Japan on the other—facts of immense
significance in East Asian affairs. Our frontier with China is of
such length that we naturally cannot remain indifferent to this
development. Japan betrayed an intention of taking possession
of Korea, our neighbour; we were therefore compelled, by force
of circumstances, to establish a sort of temporary protectorate
over it, and, by an agreement with Japan, Korea was declared to
be independent, and was ostensibly left to itself. But we did not
confine ourselves to this. For the great services we had rendered
China in the war, we obtained on commercial pretexts a concession
for a railway through Manchuria from Trans-Baikalia to Vladivostok,
and as the immediate consequence of this, we found it necessary
to try and get a concession of part of the Kuan-tung Peninsula,
with the ports of Dalny and Port Arthur.[29] This forward policy
compelled us to augment our forces in the east with troops
withdrawn from European Russia, thereby weakening, to a certain
extent, our position in the west.[30] Notwithstanding the more
active line we have taken up, and the inclusion of the whole of
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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