The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
“As regards the position of the Chinese province between the Amur
district on the north, the Ussuri district on the north-east,
and the Kuan-tung Peninsula on the south, the question naturally
arises: What shall we do with it in the future? To annex it would
be very unprofitable, not to mention the fact that the seizure
of this—one of the most important provinces of China—would for
ever destroy the ancient peaceful relationship between China and
ourselves. It would result in many Manchurians settling in our
territory, in the Amur and Ussuri districts, which now are only
thinly peopled by Russians, and our weak colonies would be swamped
by the flowing tide of yellow. Eastern Siberia would become quite
un-Russian, and it must be remembered that it is the Russians
alone who form, and will form in the future, the reliable element
of the population. Such an inrush of Chinese into the Pri-Amur
district would undoubtedly improve the standard of its agriculture
and convert its deserts into flowering gardens; but, at the same
time, surplus land in Siberia, every acre of which we ought to
preserve for our own people, would be passing into the hands of
non-Russian races. The population of Russia of the twentieth
century will need it all. As this will probably amount to some
400,000,000 in the year 2000, we must begin now to set aside land
for at least a quarter of this number. It would, therefore, be
preferable if Manchuria remained an integral part of China. But if
we decide against its annexation, we ought undoubtedly to take
every means to obtain absolute commercial control, consolidating
our position by constructing lines through it, such as the
Trans-Baikal-Vladivostok and Port Arthur railways. We should not
obtain any further concessions from China, but our policy towards
her in the near future should be—
“1. Not to permit any increase in, nor development of the training
of, her armed forces, particularly in the north, and to forbid the
presence of foreign military instructors in that quarter.
“2. To develop our social and commercial relations with her as much
as possible, in the northern provinces to commence with.
“3. To avoid as far as possible any dispute on her soil with other
European nations, to insure which we should confine our attentions
to North China, and undertake no railway enterprises south of the
Great Wall, more especially in the Yang-tsze Valley.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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