The Scientific Basis of Morals, and Other Essays: Viz.: Right and Wrong, The Ethics of Belief, The Ethics of ReligionClifford, William Kingdon
Philosophy
The Scientific Basis of Morals, and Other Essays: Viz.: Right and Wrong, The Ethics of Belief, The Ethics of Religion
Clifford, William Kingdon
Ethics
To sum up: it is wrong always, everywhere and for any one, to believe
anything upon insufficient evidence.
If a man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or
persuaded of afterward, keeps down and pushes away any doubts which
arise about it in his mind, purposely avoids the reading of books and
the company of men that call in question or discuss it, and regards
as impious those questions which cannot easily be asked without
disturbing it--the life of that man is one long sin against mankind.
If this judgment seems harsh when applied to those simple souls who
have never known better, who have been brought up from the cradle
with a horror of doubt, and taught that their eternal welfare depends
on what they believe, then it leads to the very serious question,
Who hath made Israel to sin?
It may be permitted me to fortify this judgment with the sentence
of Milton--
'A man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only
because his pastor says so, or the assembly so determine, without
knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth
he holds becomes his heresy.'
And with this famous aphorism of Coleridge--
'He who begins by loving Christianity better than Truth, will proceed
by loving his own sect or Church better than Christianity, and end
in loving himself better than all.'
Inquiry into the evidence of a doctrine is not to be made once for
all, and then taken as finally settled. It is never lawful to stifle a
doubt; for either it can be honestly answered by means of the inquiry
already made, or else it proves that the inquiry was not complete.
'But,' says one, 'I am a busy man; I have no time for the long course
of study which would be necessary to make me in any degree a competent
judge of certain questions, or even able to understand the nature of
the arguments.' Then he should have no time to believe.
II. The Weight of Authority.--Are we then to become universal skeptics,
doubting everything, afraid always to put one foot before the other
until we have personally tested the firmness of the road? Are we
to deprive ourselves of the help and guidance of that vast body of
knowledge which is daily growing upon the world, because neither
we nor any other one person can possibly test a hundredth part of
it by immediate experiment or observation, and because it would not
be completely proved if we did? Shall we steal and tell lies because
we have had no personal experience wide enough to justify the belief
that it is wrong to do so?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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