Somewhat early in the afternoon, the look-outs reported tremendous activity in the Boer camp. Across the veldt, those who cared, might have seen the enemy engaged upon some enormous earthwork, which the general consensus of opinion very quickly determined to be the emplacements for the siege guns. They were about three miles away from the town, and in a position different from that from which the guns had shelled the kopje in the morning. The frequency with which shells had exploded within the limits of Mafeking, had rendered the people somewhat callous of the consequences, and despite an official warning which was issued to the town, a large number of people stood discussing, in excited groups, the value of this news, while no small proportion of the population had gathered upon the west front to watch with their glasses the completion of the enemy's earthworks. It was three miles across the veldt, a mere black shadow upon the skyline, distinguished by its proximity to a local landmark, the "Jackal Tree," where the Boers had intrenched their Creusot gun. It was not so much that there were no other guns around us which had drawn the crowd, as the morbid curiosity to see for themselves what perhaps in a few hours they might never see again. At different points upon the eastern and western heights the Boer guns had been stationed. To the south-east there was a twelve-pounder at a very convenient range, and so placed as to act as a flanking fire to the direct onslaught of "Big Ben." Upon the extreme east there were two seven-pounders, one in position at the water springs, the other covering the entire front of the town. Upon the west and to the north the enemy had similarly placed their guns. There was a seven-pounder emplacement, with a Nordenfeldt support due west, 1,400 yards from the native stadt. Below that, and between it and the north, the Boers had a Maxim. It is, perhaps, somewhat extraordinary that an enemy who has procured the best available artillery advice, should proceed to attack the town in such a fashion, and much of the failure which has distinguished the Boer bombardment is due to the fact that, instead of concentrating their fire upon a series of given spots, they have maintained simultaneous shelling from isolated points. As their shells fell, the damage which they caused was scattered over a wide area, and confined to a building here and there. Indeed, the greater portion of the shells had merely ploughed up the streets. However, it was not to be confirmed that afternoon. An hour after noon on the following day the alarm rang out from the market place, the red flag was seen to fly from headquarters, and the inhabitants were warned to take immediate cover. Within a few minutes of the alarm, the proceedings for that day began, and the first shell thrown from the Boer battery burst over our camp. Presently on the distant skyline a tremendous cloud of smoke hurled itself into the air. The very foundations upon which Mafeking