“Let us see. Mr. King is represented to have said, that ‘the Senators will have a _powerful check_ in those _who wish for their seats_.’ This is most true—and in fact it is to this struggle for place that we owe much of the zeal for doctrines calculated to create vacancies. Mr. King proceeds—‘And the State Legislatures, if they find their delegates erring, can and will _instruct them_. Will this be no check?’ The two checks proposed, in the same {624} sentence, and put upon the same footing, are the vigilance of those who want the places of the Senators, and the instructions which the State Legislatures can and will give to them. They are said to be, as they truly are, _powerful checks_, operating with a strong influence on the will and discretion of the Senator, but not as subjecting him, _as a matter of duty_, either to the reproaches of his rivals or the opinions of the Legislature. To do this, a check must be something more than powerful; it must be irresistible, or, at least, attended by some means of carrying it out to submission—some penalty or remedy for disobedience. I consider the term _instruct_, as here used, to mean no more than counsel, advise, recommend—because Mr. King does not intimate that any right or power is vested in the Legislature to compel obedience to their instructions, or to punish a refractory Senator as an official delinquent. It is left to his option to obey or not, which is altogether inconsistent with every idea of a _right to command_. Such a right is at once met and nullified by a right to refuse. They are equal and contrary rights.”