One of the favourite designs of Napoleon at this period was to establish his power in Portugal. This the British government was determined, if possible, to prevent; and the person selected to direct the defence of our ancient ally was Lord Wellington. Confidence was felt in no other; and it was a question whether any other military leader was in all respects properly qualified for the arduous undertaking. When his lordship required thirty thousand men for the defence of Portugal, he considered the number that could be fed rather than what was necessary to fight the enemy. On this principle he asserted that success must depend on the exertions and devotedness of the native 91forces. Two points were to be secured at the very onset. One was, to concert measures by which sustenance might be secured for the united British and Portuguese army and the other, to devise plans by which the enemy should be deprived of supplies whenever and wherever he entered the country. In effecting this latter purpose it was demanded (for the exactions of war are necessarily rigorous) that the people should destroy their mills, remove their boats, break down their bridges, lay waste their fields, abandon their dwellings, and carry off their property, on whatever line the invader should penetrate; while the entire population, converted into soldiers, and closing on the rear and flanks, should cut off all resources, excepting those carried in the midst of the troops. These were hard sayings; but they were dictated by stern necessity, and were positively required for the safety of the kingdom. The call was obeyed. Part of the public property was sacrificed in order that the whole might, in some form or other, eventually be restored and rendered safe.