The author of “Supernatural Religion” starts the following difficulty in connection with this subject: “Consciousness of the difficulties which beset miracles in the present age has led many able men to deal thus illogically with them, and to represent them alternately as evidence and as objects of faith.” He then proceeds to refer to Dr. Arnold, Professor Baden Powell, and Archbishop Trench, as having been in various degrees guilty of making this confusion. I am not prepared to deny that many Christian writers have expressed themselves with great indistinctness on this subject, especially in works where miracles have been only referred to incidentally, and which only partially treat of the supernatural elements of Christianity. This question will be discussed more fully when we consider his definite objections; but it will tend to a clearer understanding of the subject if in the present place, I lay down the following propositions:— I. That it is impossible to believe in any assertion which contradicts the first principles of our reason, even if it were supposable that a miracle could be wrought in confirmation of it. II. That, although the illumination which reason imparts is imperfect, yet as it is the only instrument that we possess for the investigation of truth, attempts to disparage it are absurd. III. So far is faith from standing in opposition to reason, that it is a legitimate branch of it when exercised on a special subject matter. IV. That beliefs which reason refuses to authorise do not originate in faith but in credulity. V. That even those who entertain irrational convictions are compelled to base them on evidence of some kind which is satisfactory to themselves: that is to say, on the dictates of their own imperfect reason. VI. That, while we can believe in nothing that is contrary to our reason, yet it is perfectly rational to believe in many things which our reason would have been unable to discover. VII. That extraordinary facts which lie beyond the limits of human experience are not contrary to our reason: and it is perfectly rational to believe them whenever they are adequately attested. VIII. That a large portion of our beliefs on subjects scientific, philosophical, historical, moral, and religious, rest on testimony; the belief in them is highly rational, when the knowledge of those from whom we derive our information is adequate: and consequently that faith is a principle co‐extensive with the activities of the human mind, and is by no means confined to subjects simply religious, however intimately it may be connected with them. A few brief observations will suffice in this part of our subject.