Louisburg was now practically invested on the land side, the fleet, with its heavy armament, remaining useless, however, with respect to active co-operation in the siege itself, because its commander dared not take his ships into the harbor under fire of the enemy’s batteries. The army and navy were acting therefore without that concert which alone would have allowed their united strength to be effectively tested. On its part, the navy was simply making a display of force which could not be employed, though it maintained a strict blockade. In any case, then, the brunt of the siege must fall on the army, since, as Warren informed Pepperell, the fleet could take no part in battering the city until the harbor defences should first have been taken or silenced. And when this was done, the siege must probably have been near its end, fleet or no fleet. Pepperell manfully turned, however, to a task which he had supposed would be shared between the commodore and himself. If he was no longer confident under fresh disappointments, they developed in him unexpected firmness and most heroic patience. Let us see what this task was, and in what manner the citizen-general set about it. That it was done with true military judgment is abundantly proved by the fact that, when Louisburg was assaulted and taken in 1758, by the combined land and naval forces of Amherst and Boscawen, Pepperell’s plan of attack was followed step by step, and to the letter. [Illustration: TOWN AND FORTIFICATIONS OF LOUISBOURG IN 1745.] The Harbor Defences. The most formidable of the harbor defences were the Island Battery, to which attention has been called in a previous chapter, the Circular Battery, a work situated at the extreme northwest corner of the city walls, and forming the reverse face of the powerful Dauphin Bastion, from which the West Gate of the city opened, with the Water Battery, or Batterie de la Gréve, placed at the opposite angle of the harbor shore.[19] The cross-fire from these two batteries effectually raked the whole harbor from shore to shore, but it was by no means so dangerous as that of the Island Battery, where ships must pass within point-blank range of the heaviest artillery. Such, then, was the admirable system of harbor defences still remaining intact, even after the fall of the Royal Battery. Instead, therefore, of concentrating his whole fire upon one or two points, in his front, with a view of breaching the walls in the shortest time, and of storming the city at the head of his troops, Pepperell was made to throw half his available fire upon the batteries that were not at all in his own way, though they blocked the way to the fleet.[20] It will be seen that these circumstances imposed upon Pepperell a task of no little magnitude. They compelled him to attack the very strongest, instead of the weakest, parts of the fortress, and necessarily confined the siege operations within a comparatively small space of the enemy’s long line.