The immediate objects of the fire fight within effective rifle range are to produce a fire sufficiently heavy to overcome the fire of the defence, and to reach a position from which the assault can be delivered (I.T., 121 (5 and 6)). In theory, then, the desideratum is to get so many men up to about two hundred yards from the enemy that they form a line practically shoulder to shoulder, in order that their fire may be at least as heavy as that of the enemy, if the latter are also in one continuous line, and in default of circumstances admitting of effective covering fire being maintained from positions in rear or on a flank. On this supposition it is frequently argued that a battalion and its companies, when advancing to the attack, should do so on a front not greater than that which the battalion would occupy if it were in single rank, but this does not really follow. The nature of the ground may be such that to attempt to build up a shoulder-to-shoulder firing line all along the enemy’s position within charging distance, may be merely to send men to useless destruction by exposing them on fire-swept spaces, where they are sure to be knocked over before they can do any good. On the other hand, there may be other points where men may be massed so as to give not only a firing line of maximum density, but also a supporting force both to replace casualties and to carry out the assault. These are the points which it is of importance to gain and hold in strength sufficient to carry out the object of the attack—the assault. It is the duty of the battalion commander to give each of his firing line companies some such point as their objective, and to define the frontage and direction of their attack. It is similarly the duty of the commander of a firing line company to give each of his sections an objective within the limits assigned to his company (I.T., 122 (4) and 123 (3-)). The problem for solution is, how to get to those points, and so it does not appear to matter much what frontage the battalion and its companies occupy when they start off for the attack at the fourteen hundred yards limit of effective rifle fire, provided of course, they do not encroach on the frontage of other units. Indeed, an attack which starts on a wide base and concentrates only in its later stages seems much more likely than one which starts from base equal to a single rank frontage to keep the enemy uncertain of its objective, and to be able to bring oblique or enfilade fire to bear on portions of his line. Therefore, when practising the company in attack, do not be bound by cast iron rules as to the breadth of the zone of ground within which you are to bring your company from fourteen hundred yards up to the charging position. Four platoons following one straight behind the other, at two hundred yards distance, make a very unwieldy procession, and, in general, I would advise you to use something in the nature of a