The same rules of construction, that apply to statutes, apply also to all those private contracts between man and man, _which courts actually enforce_. But as it is both the right and the duty of courts to invalidate altogether such private contracts as are inconsistent with justice, they will admit evidence exterior to their words, _if offered by a defendant for the purpose of invalidating them_. At the same time, a plaintiff, or party that wishes to set up a contract, or that claims its fulfilment, will not be allowed to offer any evidence exterior to its words, to prove that the contract is contrary to justice--because, if his evidence were admitted, it would not make his unjust claim a legal one; but only invalidate it altogether. But as courts do not claim the right of invalidating statutes and constitutions, they will not admit evidence, exterior to their language, to give them such a meaning, that they ought to be invalidated. I think no one--no lawyer, certainly--will now deny that it is a legal rule of interpretation--that must be applied to all statutes, and also to all private contracts _that are to be enforced_--that an innocent meaning, _and nothing beyond an innocent meaning_, must be given to all language that will possibly bear such a meaning. All will probably admit that the rule, as laid down by the supreme court of the United States, is correct, to wit, that "where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of the law is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with _irresistible clearness_, to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects." But perhaps it will be said that these rules, which apply to all statutes, and to all private contracts that are to be enforced, do not apply to the constitution. And why do they not? No reason whatever can be given. A constitution is nothing but a contract, entered into by the mass of the people, instead of a few individuals. This contract of the people at large becomes a law unto the judiciary that administer it, just as private contracts, (so far as they are consistent with natural right,) are laws unto the tribunals that adjudicate upon them. All the essential principles that enter into the question of obligation, in the case of a private contract, or a legislative enactment, enter equally into the question of the obligation of a contract agreed to by the whole mass of the people. This is too self-evident to need illustration.